Necessary but not Sustainable? The Limits of Democracy in Achieving Environmental Sustainability by Povitkina, Marina
Necessary but not Sustainable? The Limits of Democracy in
Achieving Environmental Sustainability
Marina Povitkina
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Doctoral Dissertation in Political Science
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
2018
©Marina Povitkina
Cover graph: A scatterplot showing the relationship between democracy, mea-
sured by Electoral Democracy Index from the Varieties of Democracy institute,
version v7.1, and quality of government, measured by the Indicator of Quality of
Government from the International Country Risk Guide developed by the PRS
group, year 2010.
Printing: BrandFactory, Gothenburg, 2018
ISBN 978-91-984402-4-9 (print)
ISBN 978-91-984402-5-6 (pdf)
ISSN 0346-5942
Published articles have been reprinted with permission from the copyright hold-
ers.
This study is included as number 155 in the series Göteborg Studies in Politics,
edited by Bo Rothstein, Department of Political Science, University of Gothen-
burg.
Abstract
The world today faces a number of environmental problems that are both se-
vere and urgent. Finding effective solutions is one of the top priorities for the
international community, with at least half of the United Nations Sustainable De-
velopment Goals relating either directly or indirectly to reaching environmental
sustainability. The question is: How to reach these goals? Environmental prob-
lems pose a complex dilemma for decision-makers. They have low visibility, a slow
response time to policy interventions and often require multi-pronged policy so-
lutions that are sufficiently funded, supported and rigorously enforced. Yet, they
are rarely the first priority for voters. Solutions to environmental problems there-
fore rely on long-term vision and commitments, appropriate expertise, as well as
institutions that can secure compliance from all the relevant actors.
This dissertation looks at the political institutions that, it is argued, make
countries more likely to commit to and reach environmental sustainability goals.
It revisits previous findings indicating that democratic institutions are more con-
ducive to securing strong environmental performance. Democracy, which shapes
the rules of preference aggregation and thus influences environmental decision-
making and policy adoption, does not necessarily guarantee that these policies
will be successfully implemented. This dissertation argues that the performance
of democracies in achieving environmental sustainability depends on the quality of
government, which, broadly, encompasses the absence of corruption, high rule of
law and high bureaucratic capacity. Quality of government shapes the implemen-
tation of public policies, but it may also affect the incentives of decision-makers in
environmental policy-making. This dissertation hypothesizes that democracy and
quality of government interact in the production of environmental sustainability
outcomes.
The five articles included in the dissertation test this overarching hypothesis on
four key Sustainable Development Goals related to environmental sustainability:
the reduction of CO2 emissions to avert climate change, preparedness for natural
disasters that may arise as a result of climate change, the provision of energy, and
the provision of clean water. The results are consistent across the studies and show
that more democracy is only beneficial for environmental sustainability outcomes
when high quality of government is in place. However, when quality of government
is low, democracies tend to underperform, doing no better or doing even worse than
authoritarian regimes. Corruption, weak public administration, and lack of rule
of law undermine incentives for and the credibility of policy efforts, and obstruct
the implementation of public policies related to environmental sustainability, thus
limiting democratic governments’ ability to act in the long-term interests of the
public.
Sammanfattning på svenska
Världen idag står inför omfattande miljöproblem som är både allvarliga och bråd-
skande. Att hitta effektiva lösningar på dessa problem är av högsta prioritet för det
internationella samfundet. Ett uttryck för detta är att minst hälften av Förenta
Nationernas uppsatta mål kring hållbar utveckling just handlar om att direkt eller
indirekt nå olika miljömål. Frågan är bara: Hur nås dessa mål? Miljöproblem
utgör ett komplext dilemma för beslutsfattare. De är inte alltid direkt synliga,
det tar ofta lång tid innan riktade policyåtgärder ger verkan och de kräver ofta
mångfacetterade lösningar som är tillräckligt finansierade samt har stöd och kraft
att genomföras. Samtidigt har dessa problem sällan första prioritet bland väljarna.
Lösningar på miljöproblem kräver därför långsiktiga synsätt och åtaganden men
även rätt kompetens och institutioner som kan säkra följsamhet från relevanta
aktörer.
Den här avhandlingen fokuserar på de politiska institutioner som har inflytande
över i vilken utsträckning länder verkligen åtar sig och når uppsatta miljömål.
Avhandlingen omprövar tidigare forskningsresultat som indikerar att demokratiska
institutioner har en betydande roll i att främja ett hållbart miljöarbete. Demokrati
formar spelreglerna för aggregering av intressen och påverkar således beslutsfat-
tandet i miljöfrågor och hur de införs. Samtidigt demokrati i sig garanterar inte
lyckad implementering. Den här avhandlingen argumenterar för att kvalitet i
samhällsstyrningen är ett nödvändigt villkor för att demokratier ska kunna nå
miljömässig hållbarhet. Samhällsstyrningens kvalitet innefattar sådant som grad
av korruption, rättssäkerhet och effektiv förvaltning. Därigenom både formar den
implementeringen av politiska beslut och kan påverka incitament för beslutsfattare
att anta miljöpolicy. Den här avhandlingen argumenterar för att demokrati och
kvalitet i samhällsstyrningen interagerar med varandra i att skapa förutsättningar
att nå hållbara miljöresultat.
De fem artiklar som ingår i avhandlingen testar den övergripande hypotesen som
förutsätter att både demokrati och kvalitet i samhällsstyrningen är nödvändiga
för att skapa bättre miljö- och hållbarhetsarbete. Avhandlingen fokuserar på fyra
hållbarhetsmål som relaterar till miljö: minskning av koldioxidutsläpp, beredskap
för naturkatastrofer som kan följa av klimatförändringar, energiförsörjning samt
försörjning av rent vatten. Resultaten är konsekventa i de olika studierna och visar
att demokrati bara är fördelaktigt för miljön om det samtidigt finns hög kvalitet i
samhällsstyrningen. Om däremot kvaliteten i samhällsstyrningen är låg, tenderar
demokratiska stater att inte överträffa, eller till och med göra sämre ifrån sig, än
auktoritära regimer. Korruption, svag offentlig förvaltning samt svaga rättssäk-
erhetsprinciper tycks undergräva incitament och trovärdigheten i policyåtgärder
samt hindra implementeringen av åtgärder relaterade till miljömässig hållbarhet.
I förlängningen begränsar detta ett demokratiskt styrelseskicks förmåga att kunna
säkra befolkningens långsiktiga intressen.
Contents
Acknowledgements 1
1 Research problem 7
2 Previous research 13
3 Theoretical framework 17
3.1 Environmental sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 The role of the state in achieving environmental sustainability . . . 22
3.3 Democracy and environmental sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4 Quality of government and environmental sustainability . . . . . . . 32
3.5 Hypothesizing the interaction between democracy and quality of
government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4 Research design 47
4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5 Empirical findings 69
6 Concluding discussion 73
6.1 Avenues for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
References 81
Appendix 99
Articles I-V 100
List of Tables
1 Characteristics of environmental problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 Democracy and the environment, some of the main mechanisms
summarized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 QoG and the environment, some of the main mechanisms summarized 36
4 Summary of the articles included in the dissertation . . . . . . . . . 49
List of Figures
1 Three pillars of sustainable development (SD) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2 Political system by Easton (1953), amended . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Political institutions that shape the input-side of the political system 27
4 Political institutions that shape the output-side of the political system 33
5 Political institutions that shape the input and output of the political
system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6 Two alternative patterns of the relationship between democracy and
QoG in their effect on environmental sustainability . . . . . . . . . 43
7 The relationship between democracy, quality of government and
environmetnal sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
8 Countries plotted according to democracy and QoG dimensions . . 58
The following papers are reproduced with the permission from the publishers:
Povitkina, Marina (2018) The limits of democracy in tackling climate change,
Environmental Politics, 27(3):411–432
Lægreid, Ole Martin and Povitkina, Marina (2018) Do Political Institutions Mod-
erate GDP-CO2 relationship? Ecological Economics 145(March 2018): 441-450
Ahlbom Persson, Tove and Povitkina, Marina (2017) “Gimme Shelter”: the Role of
Democracy and Institutional Quality in Disaster Preparedness. Political Research
Quarterly 70(4): 833–847

Acknowledgements
As a rule, a doctoral dissertation awards credit to a single person, but as much
as I would like to think that this dissertation is a result of my own thoughts and
continuous work over the past five years; this is far from the truth. A large number
of people have influenced the development of the arguments in this dissertation.
At this point, it is very difficult to disentangle my own thoughts from all the ideas,
hints and comments expressed by my brilliant and kind supervisors, smart col-
leagues, attentive discussants, clever anonymous reviewers and challenging journal
editors over the five years of writing, as every comment, even the smallest one, has
shaped the direction of this dissertation in its own unique way. In this preamble,
I would like to thank the people, who have contributed to the final product of this
dissertation with their precious time and effort.
I would happily write a thousand pages of thank you notes (if this could be of
any value) to my supervisors, Sverker Jagers and Marcia Grimes, and it would
never be enough to express my gratitude for their unsurpassable contribution to
this dissertation and my academic training. Many of the ideas in this dissertation
were born and developed during our meetings, which were always so insightful,
inspiring and fun. The worst part of finishing my PhD education is to have to
suddenly stop the joint meetings and discussions that lightened my whole day
and even the week that followed. You always saw a way forward when I did
not, and I am deeply grateful that you taught me how to pass through the dark
forest of confusion, so inherent in academic research, into the light of answers and
solutions. I truly hope that we can continue working together in the future, one
way or another.
To Sverker, I am particularly grateful that you have been a constant source of in-
spiration and encouragement from the first day we met. Thank you for ceaselessly
supporting my ideas and believing that even the most feeble and seemingly stupid
hunch deserved attention. Some important aspects of this dissertation originate
from such hunches. And most of all – thank you for your counsel and encourage-
ment with my application for the PhD position. I would not have been where I
am today without you.
To Marcia, I am particularly thankful that you have constantly been a role model
of an exceptionally smart and excellent researcher and an amazing teacher; for your
constant support and help, and for having the sharp vision to see through any
problems. Thank you for always coming up with the most brilliant comments and
generously helping me to express what I mean with the most perfect formulations.
A special thank you to Carl Dahlström for making my PhD journey as smooth
1
as I could possibly hope for. Thank you for providing perfect guidance throughout
the confusing first year, for making sure PhD students feel happy and secure, and
for always being so incredibly supportive, kind and positive. You made our yearly
meetings my favorite day of the year.
I also greatly appreciate the time, effort and dedication of people who have con-
tinuously supported me as mentors throughout my PhD journey. Endless thanks
to my informal supervisor, Jonathan Polk, for constantly inspiring and encourag-
ing me with strategic advice on every aspect of PhD life and for your immense help
throughout the writing process. I am very lucky that you are at our department.
I am also very grateful to my “fadder”, Aksel Sundström, for being by my side
since the first days at the department, for being a wise mentor in all work matters
and strategic decisions, and for continuously checking on my progress throughout
the years, which helped me to move many of the papers forward, when they were
resting peacefully in the drawer.
I would especially like to thank Bo Rothstein and Sören Holmberg for gathering
an incredible team of people at the Quality of Government Institute. QoG for
me has been a haven of creativity, inspiration, productivity, inclusion and equal-
ity, where being a young researcher is pure bliss. I am very grateful to the QoG
researchers, who contributed to this friendly, encouraging, and inspiring environ-
ment, read and commented on my papers, and supported my work throughout
these years: Amy Alexander, Monika Bauhr, my co-author Frida Boräng, my
TSCS friend Rasmus Broms, Andreas Bågenholm, Nicholas Charron, Agnes Cor-
nell, Stefan Dahlberg, Carl Dahlström, Jenny de Fine Licht, Victor Lapuente,
Birgitta Niklasson, Marina Nistotskaya, Anna Persson, Helena Stensöta, Anders
Sundell, Lena Wängnerud, and Georgios Xezonakis. It was a privilege to be a
QoG PhD student thanks to you and I always left QoG conferences with the best
feedback on my papers I had ever received thanks to your thorough reading and
constructive comments.
I am deeply grateful to the researchers at the Varieties of Democracy institute
for the incredibly helpful feedback at the V-Dem conferences and to Staffan Lind-
berg for inviting me to be part of the institute’s activities, conferences, kick-offs,
breakfasts, and after works, and for giving me the opportunity to benefit from
the incredible collective intellect of the people involved in the project. In par-
ticular, I am grateful to Kyle Markwardt, Steven Wilson, Brigitte Seim, Rachel
Sigman, Constanza Sanhuenza Petrarca, Dan Pemstein, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting
Wang, Jeffrey Staton, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, and John Gerring for
great discussions at the conferences and beyond. Additionally, a big thanks to the
V-Dem data team, Joshua Krusell, Johannes Von Römer, Moa Olin, and Farhad
Miri, for making sure that the V-Dem dataset is top quality.
2
Big and warm thanks to the researchers at the Center for Environmental Po-
litical Science at the University of Gothenburg – Martin Sjöstedt, Niklas Harring,
Björn Rönnerstrand, Helene Ahlborg, Aksel Sundström, Sverker Jagers, Jacob
Sohlberg, Mathias Zannakis, Andreas Hofmann, my co-author Ole Martin Læ-
greid, Lennart Lundqvist, Kristina Hojckova, Johan Martinsson, Ulrika Möller, as
well as invited guests – Simon Matti, Andreas Duit, Eric Coleman, and Malcolm
Fairbrother, for the incredibly productive and fun workshops, and the exception-
ally helpful comments on my papers. Special thanks are to Martin Sjöstedt for
the careful reading of my papers and always fantastic comments, fun at the con-
ferences and incredibly productive paper writing. I hope we can co-author more
articles in the future. Special thanks are also to Björn Rönnerstrand for the in-
spiring enthusiasm and always encouraging comments and to Niklas Harring for
reading my papers at each stage of the writing process and coming up with new,
clever insights at each read.
An additional thank you to the people who read the drafts of the introduc-
tory chapter to the dissertation and provided insightful comments and feedback,
which helped to advance the chapter considerably - Ellen Last, Simon Matti,
Anna Lührmann, Bo Rothstein, Robyn Eckersely, Clayton Chin, Roberto Foa,
and Michael Ting.
I am especially grateful to Robyn Eckersley for an exceptionally warm welcome
at the University of Melbourne, help with arranging the seminar at the Depart-
ment of Political Science and invaluable feedback on the theoretical sections of the
dissertation. I also would like to thank Malte Meinshausen for the outstanding hos-
pitality at the Australian-German Climate and Energy College at the University
of Melbourne. It was a great pleasure to meet your invigorating team of bright and
inspiring young scholars and to be a part of this outstanding group. Big thanks
are also due to Sebastian Thomas for organizing a seminar at the Sustainability
research group at the University of Melbourne and for very helpful feedback.
I am also very grateful to Carl Henrik Knutsen, for hosting me at the De-
partment of Political Science at the University of Oslo. Thank you for your most
positive attitude and encouraging and, at the same time, brilliant comments. Your
feedback has been thought-provoking and invaluable in advancing the papers of
this dissertation. I would like to additionally thank my discussants at conferences,
who contributed to the development of the papers included in this dissertation:
Adriana Bunea, Shane Barter, Daniel Bell, Mogens Justensen, Jacob Hariri, Lauri
Peterson and Jakob Skovgaard, for their careful reading of my papers and great
constructive comments.
In general, I would like to thank the researchers at the Department of Polit-
ical Science at the University of Gothenburg, as well as the department’s head
3
Mikael Gilljam and the deputy head Ann-Marie Ekengren, for an inspiring, cre-
ative, encouraging and friendly research environment with a culture of attending
PhD seminars, feedback from which helped enormously in developing this disser-
tation. The administrative side of the process would not have been as smooth
without the skillful administrative support from the department. I would like
to thank Karin Jorthé, Lena Caspers, Anna-Karin Ingelström, Marianne Ander-
sson, Li Malmberg-Wahle, Raija Saikkonen, Petar Margitin, and Ola Björklund
for your enormous help and precious time. My appreciation also extends to the
funding agencies and institutes who helped finance my conference attendance, vis-
iting terms at other universities, methods schools, fieldwork, and the proofread:
Center for Collective Action Research, Quality of Government Institute, Varieties
of Democracy Institute, Swedish Network for European Studies (SNES), Adler-
bert Scholarships, Stiftelse Siamon, Swedish National Data Service, The Grants
Committee of the Philosophical Faculties at the University of Gothenburg, and
ECPR travel grants. Additional thanks to John Jennings for proofreading most of
the text included in this dissertation.
Unfortunately, genetics has ruthlessly deprived me of the talent to summarize
my arguments in creative titles. One of the great advantages of working at the
Department of Political Science in Gothenburg is its creative spirit and willingness
to help from people who are more skilled. Special credit is due to Ruth Carlitz for
coming up with the title for my dissertation and generously sharing it with me.
I am very grateful for our department’s policy of starting several people on
their PhD education at the same time. Being part of a “generation” and always
having someone “on the same page” provides great support and relief. I would like
to thank Kety, Petrus, Anders and Karin as a group for being the coolest, most
supportive, fun, “strong, smart and stylish” gang of all time. It has been a great
pleasure sharing these years with you and to walk this way together. Personally,
I would like to thank Karin Zelano for being an awesome, positive, always smiling
and optimistic, ready to help, and tolerant roommate, who is hopelessly patient
with my plants and my different door policy. Thank you for superbly initiating our
hangouts together, for the top-quality receptions, and for giving me a hand with
accommodation when I was in desperate need. To Petrus Olander, I am thankful
for your never-ending kindness and readiness to help, superfun chats, insightful
discussions on TSCS and exceptionally helpful STATA codes. I learned so much
from you. To Anders Malm, I am thankful for your positive spirit and for always
being present, even without necessarily being at the department. The biggest
thanks are to my friend, fieldwork-buddy and co-author Kety Bolkvadze. Without
your radiant smile and open heart, Gothenburg would have been much more gray
and lonely. Our paper and fieldwork was one of the best synergetic effects I have
4
ever experienced and I am looking forward to more projects together.
Apart from that, I would also like to thank the current and former PhD stu-
dents and research assistants at the department of Political Science at the Uni-
versity of Gothenburg for their moral support and a great time during lunches,
after works and parties during these five years, and for being a great group to be
a part of: Elina Lindgren, Erik Vestin, Elin Bergman, Sebastian Lundmark, Olof
Larsson, Fredrik D. Hjorthen, Maria Tyrberg, Mattias Agerberg, Marcus Tannen-
berg, Valeriya Mechkova, Dragana Davidovic, Nicholas Sorak, Sofia Jonsson, Love
Chirstensen, Stephen Dawson, Felix Dwinger, Moa Frödin Gruneau, Anne-Kathrin
Kreft, Niels Markwat, Maciej Sychowiec, Natalia Stepanova, Josefine Pernes, my
co-author Tove Ahlbom Persson, Maria Lilleste and Sofia Axelsson. I am also
grateful to Mikael Holmgren for the company at the department during evenings
and weekends in the early years of PhD education, and for being a supportive
friend and instructive guide to strategic thinking over the years. I greatly appre-
ciate your smart comments even if the main arguments in our dissertations do not
necessarily align.
Special thanks to the Quality of Government data, administration and associate
research team, former and current members: Dalila Sabanic, Richard Svensson,
Alice Johansson, Felix Hartmann, Anna Khomenko, Aiysha Varraich, Jonaz Björk,
and Sofia Wiman for great fun together, unforgettable travel through majestic
and underappreciated Bosnia, “national” dinners and movie nights, and refreshing
lunch breaks in the park that filled me with energy for the rest of the day. You
added the warmth and sunshine of friendship to my PhD years.
In the mobile academic world, one has to part with favorite people far too often.
I am deeply grateful to my best friend and colleague Linn Sandberg, who I met at
the Department of Political Science in Gothenburg, for being the greatest support
and comfort in the darkest times of my PhD struggles. Thank you for always being
there for me during the PhD years, for your encouragement and smart, insightful
comments on my drafts, which always gave me a new perspective on my work.
Big thanks are also to Raimondas Ibenskas for the great fun during the first years
of PhD education, your clever feedback on my papers, wise strategic advice and
support, and peaceful positive spirit. I hope all of us will live in the same town
again someday.
Last but not least, I would like to thank people from outside academia for their
support, for without it the writing process would have been much harder. I am
deeply grateful to my parents, Galina and Sergei, for constantly reminding me
that there are more important things in life by never asking me what I was writing
about (until someone asked them) and instead constantly enquiring if I am healthy,
if I sleep, eat and have time to go out.
5
I am grateful to the Seeman and Lodding families in Gothenburg for warmly
welcoming me into their family circles and making me feel at home in Sweden:
to Torsten, Ann-Britt, Helene, Per, Johan, Ulrika, and also Keith, Annette and
Amelia Krusell, who are on the other side of the world, but nevertheless always
present and caring. You all became like family to me. A special thank you to
Joshua Krusell for reminding me that there is life outside academia, for always
challenging my dissertation ideas with a healthy dose of eye-opening, constructivist
critique, and also for introducing me to and helping me with R Markdown, a
software, in which this dissertation was written.
Gothenburg, April 2018
6
1
Research problem
Let us consider two low-lying coastal countries prone to storms and severe floods.
One of them experiences extensive flooding every year, which each time creates
massive destruction, leaving thousands of people affected and millions of dollars in
damage. The other has constant storms and similarly high risk of floods, but each
time the local rivers overflow hardly anyone is affected and damage rarely exceeds
half a million dollars. These two countries are Bangladesh and the Netherlands.
Both have more than half of their territories exposed to extreme weather events
and high population densities under high risk, but the outcomes are strikingly
different.
Examples of such striking differences in the degree of environmental problems
around the world are plentiful. Water quality in Moldova and its close neighbor
Romania was severely affected by Soviet industrial activities between the 1960s and
1980s. Nowadays, however, while water quality in Moldova is one of the worst on
the European continent, citizens in Romania can safely drink water from the tap.
Tokyo and Shanghai are two vibrant and highly populated metropolitan hubs, but
while air quality in Tokyo is relatively high, Shanghai’s residents are often forced
to stay inside due to high pollution warnings. What can explain such variations
in environmental conditions?
Preparing for natural disasters, providing safe drinking water or ensuring good
air quality are tasks for national governments. In this dissertation, I argue that
in order to understand the differences in how countries take care of their environ-
ment, we have to look at the institutions that shape the functioning of a country’s
political system. On the one hand, these are the institutions that shape the artic-
ulation of the demand for a healthy environment, which, as a consequence, affect
whether environmental issues appear on the political agenda. On other hand, these
are the institutions that shape the implementation of environmental policies. The
interaction between these two sets of political institutions influences how political
systems respond to environmental challenges.
Despite its crucial role in ensuring environmental sustainability, the state has
received little attention within environmental political science research (for studies
on the role of the state in solving environmental problems see, for example, Barry
and Eckersley 2005b; Duit 2014; Jänicke, Weidner, and Jörgens 1997). Instead,
studies have predominantly focused on searching for solutions to environmental
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problems either locally or globally. Indeed, many environmental issues are lo-
cal in character. Most natural resources suffer from problems with open access,
and their sustainable use is therefore tightly connected to solving collective action
dilemmas stemming from open access (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990). Collective
action dilemmas encompass situations in which individuals have to sacrifice some
degree of their short-term self-interest for the collective long-term benefit (Dawes
1980; Olson 1977). In the case of natural resource management, collective action
dilemmas imply the clash between personal interest in resource overexploitation
for the maximum gain in the short term and sustainable resource use that allows
continuous exploitation of a resource over a long period of time. Achieving collec-
tive long-term benefit or in this case, sustainable use of natural resources, requires
successful collective action or cooperation among resource users and a willingness
to sacrifice in the short-term for the benefit of the collective in the long-term. As
a consequence, a large strand of research has focused on determining the factors
that influence individual behavioural choices, that is the proneness of individuals
to engage in collective action, cooperate and manage the resources sustainably
(see, for example, Ostrom 1990; Agrawal and Goyal 2001; Anderies et al. 2011;
Berkes 1989; Ostrom et al. 2002; Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994).
Apart from posing multiple local challenges, many – probably even most – en-
vironmental problems are also inherently global. All the ecosystems on the planet
are linked: particles travel and penetrate into ecosystems far from the location of
the emitters; inhabitants of marine ecosystems and animals migrate and spread
diseases and pollutants; algae on the surface of oceans produces oxygen, which
enters the atmosphere and spreads through the air (Rockström, Steffen, Noone,
Persson, Chapin, et al. 2009a). Such inherent interdependency of global ecosys-
tems has given rise to a strand of literature searching for solutions to environ-
mental problems in the international arena. This literature focuses on interna-
tional environmental regime formation, transnational environmental governance,
international institutions building, lobbying in international negotiations, as well
as signing and ratification of international environmental treaties (see, for exam-
ple, Young 1989, 1999; Baettig, Brander, and Imboden 2008; Bäckstrand 2008;
Bernauer and Betzold 2012; Biermann and Pattberg 2012; Bulkeley et al. 2014;
Carraro 1997; Hoffmann 2011; Meyer et al. 1997; Pattberg 2005, 2007).
States, however, play a key role in solving both local and global environmental
problems. They set rules for domestic actors’ behavior in natural resource use
and are thus able to regulate actors’ choices in environmental collective action and
affect environmental outcomes within their borders. At the same time, they are
key negotiating parties in the international arena: they determine whether to sign
or not to sign international environmental agreements and whether to ratify them
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by applying international guidelines to their domestic legislation.
It is also within the function of states to secure the provision of environmental
goods to citizens. Environmental projects usually require large-scale implemen-
tation and coordination schemes to reach out to broad segments of populations.
They also imply the necessity of extensive investment with uncertain returns,
which might only be visible in the long run. It is difficult to exclude people from
the benefits of environmental projects such as good air quality or preparedness for
natural disasters. It is, therefore, possible for individuals to receive the benefits
of such projects without directly paying for them. Due to the high risk of such
externalities, the large scale of environmental projects, and the uncertain return on
investments, private markets tend to underprovide environmental benefits to the
population if left to their own devices (Fukuyama 2014a; Neumayer 1999). Indi-
vidual initiatives, such as building private wells or installing air cleaners at home,
are also not enough to address the large-scale problems that stem from the many
interconnected processes, which individuals are unable to influence. National gov-
ernments have the potential to collect the economic means needed for tackling such
large-scale problems by encompassing them within public policies and delivering
improvements in environmental conditions, among other public goods.
Despite these core roles in solving (or contributing to) environmental problems,
the state has received little attention within environmental politics research. While
recent studies have attempted to draw attention to the necessity of studying the
state for an understanding of environmental problems (Barry and Eckersley 2005a;
Duit 2014, 2016; Eckersley 2004; Hanf and Jansen 1998; Jänicke, Weidner, and
Jörgens 1997; Lundqvist 1980; Meadowcroft 2012), we still know very little about
which characteristics make states more likely to commit to environmental goals
and move forward on the path towards environmental sustainability. In contrast,
in political science the state itself has been the center of attention, however, the
environmental challenges that the states have to face have been largely overlooked.
In political science, the provision of environmental benefits to the population, such
as clean water and clean air, is often equated to the provision of other welfare
benefits, such as health, education, unemployment insurance, pensions, and other
government services related to social support and maintaining human well-being.
Public services related to environmental protection, however, pose a combina-
tion of complex challenges, which makes them distinct from other public services
in several respects. First, the provision of welfare benefits is primarily driven by
domestic challenges, while actions towards protection of the environment stem ad-
ditionally from the global environmental crisis and the outcomes of these actions
will have spillover effects internationally. Second, taxation schemes to generate
budgets for environmental action are not as well integrated in the national fiscal
9
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systems as taxation plans for generating social welfare. Third, environmental is-
sues have a combination of characteristics which make them complex problems for
decision-makers to address. These characteristics include: having a large number
of actors on multiple levels involved in determining the outcomes, the low visibility
of results, multiple sources of the problem, and diluted sources of responsibility.
Other social welfare problems also possess some of these characteristics: however
such a combination is rare in other policy areas. Fourth, science plays a larger role
in determining environmental goals than in the sphere of social welfare (Gough
2016; Meadowcroft 2005). Environmental issues are thus complex, technically, po-
litically and administratively, and the strategies towards successful environmental
performance are not yet established. Therefore, with the rise of environmental
challenges, there is a need to define the role of the state in addressing environ-
mental problems and revisit its current functions in the provision of social welfare,
extending these towards the new environmental domain.
The overall ambition of this dissertation is to bring a focus on the role of the state
in addressing the issues of environmental sustainability and investigate character-
istics of states conducive to strong environmental performance. As environmental
issues are multidimensional, the role of the state can be studied from various dif-
ferent perspectives. In solving collective action dilemmas on a subnational level,
the state can be seen as an external rule enforcer and a source of legitimate co-
ercion for rule compliance and cooperation (Mansbridge 2014; Ostrom 1990). In
global governance structures on a supranational level, the state can be studied as
a negotiating actor deciding on the signing and ratification of international envi-
ronmental treaties (Baettig, Brander, and Imboden 2008; Eckersley 2004). In this
dissertation, I focus on the national level, that is the state itself and its characteris-
tics, which connects to, and also has implications for, global and subnational levels
of environmental problem-solving (Duit 2014). More specifically, the dissertation
taps into the functioning of the political system of states, examining such features
as are favorable to achieving environmental sustainability goals.
The rest of the introductory chapter of the dissertation proceeds as follows. In
Section 2, I review the previous research on the role of the state in achieving envi-
ronmental sustainability and present the aim of the study. In Section 3, I discuss
the concept of environmental sustainability and the implications of the ecosystems’
characteristics for environmental decision-making, as well as discuss the theoreti-
cal arguments as to why democratic institutions and quality of government matter
for ensuring environmental sustainability. I also present the hypothesis positing
the interaction between democracy and quality of government in their effect on
environmental sustainability and build this dissertation’s theoretical model. In
Section 4, I describe strategies for operationalization of the main concepts of the
10
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dissertation, describe the methods used in the articles, and discuss the limitations
of the selected approaches. In Section 5, I present the empirical findings of the five
articles included in the dissertation. Section 6 concludes and discusses possible
avenues for future research.
11
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Previous research
Within the scarce literature on the role of the state in achieving environmental
sustainability and the characteristics of political systems favorable for reaching en-
vironmental goals, the research has primarily focused on studying factors conducive
to pro-environmental decision-making. These include the representation of green
interests or green parties in government (Knill, Debus, and Heichel 2010; Muller-
Rommel and Poguntke 2002), whether the form of government is presidential or
parliamentary (Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007), the form of the relationship be-
tween the state and society that defines the rules for interest group representation
(Neumayer 2003; Scruggs 2001; Siaroff 1999), or the number of veto points and
players that determines the complexity of the decision-making process (Jänicke
2005; Tsebelis 2002). These factors may indeed play a role for environmental
policy-making. However, a bigger puzzle is; which of the underlying institutional
conditions that create the framework for these decisions-making processes to un-
fold – democratic or authoritarian regime type – is beneficial for the environment?
As of the current state of research, this puzzle still remains unsolved.
Regime type is a set of formal and informal rules that shape access to polit-
ical power. It “determines the methods of access to the principal public offices;
the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the
strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in
the making of publicly binding decisions” (Schmitter and Karl 1991). Regimes,
according to some classifications, can be broadly dichotomized into authoritarian
and democratic, but the variation spans from totalitarian dictatorships of one-man
rule to liberal democracies with relatively free and fair multi-party competition.
In the existing literature, there is a large debate on whether democratic forms
of government are beneficial for the environment. The normative debate on the
democracy-environment nexus presents contradictory views. Some scholars criti-
cize the modern form of democracy for its liberal values and therefore inability to
oppose people’s reluctance to engage in environmental protection (Ehrlich 1968;
Heilbroner 1974; Kennedy 1993; Ophuls 1977). Others emphasize that the current
form of democracy is too weak and does not appropriately represent the will of the
people, relying on corporate interests instead, and call for more democracy rather
than less (De-Shalit 2000; Dryzek 1990, 1992; Hayward 1998; Jacobs 1991; Saward
1993). Yet another school of thought insists that liberal democracy can be com-
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patible with environmental values, as it guarantees essential human rights, such
as freedom of expression and association, which contribute to stronger environ-
mental protection, and the right to a healthy life, which is inherently connected to
the health of ecological systems (Eckersley 1992, 1995, 2004; Goodin 1992; Jagers
2007; Passmore 1974; Sagoff 1988; Saward 1993; Wissenburg 1998).
In parallel, empirical research has focused on studying the actual performance
of democratic regimes with respect to various environmental outcomes. Empirical
accounts of the problem have produced somewhat inconclusive results. The major-
ity of studies find that more democracy is associated with favorable environmental
outcomes (see, for example, Barrett and Graddy 2000; Bättig and Bernauer 2009;
Bernauer and Koubi 2009; Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007; Gleditsch and Sver-
drup 2003; Li and Reuveny 2006; Neumayer 2002; Sjöstedt and Jagers 2014), apart
from a few exceptions that report the opposite (e.g., Midlarsky 1998). However,
the results are inconsistent between different indicators of environmental perfor-
mance, with no particular pattern that could potentially hint at why democracy
tends to have a positive association with some outcomes but does not seem to be
related to others.
One of the major drawbacks of these studies is that they do not differentiate
between the possibly heterogeneous effects of democratization at different levels of
democratic development or in different regime types. Instead they simply report
a general observation on whether more democracy is associated with better envi-
ronmental outcomes. However, is more democracy always better than autocratic
rule? The real world examples show that there is a large variation in how democ-
racies perform in ensuring environmental sustainability. Perhaps moving from the
democratic institutions of Poland to the democratic level of Germany might pro-
duce noticeable improvements in environmental commitments; however, would the
effects be the same when moving from authoritarian Russia to a low-level democ-
racy like in Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova? Several studies attribute the different
performance of democracies to countries’ different economic capacities (Arvin and
Lew 2009; Povitkina et al. 2015; Spilker 2013). However, very few suggest that
such variation might stem not only from the lack of financial resources, which
might well be a consequence of more underlying reasons, but from the actual in-
ability of some states to reach their official goals or, in other words, the lack of
state capacity (Skocpol 1985, 9).
The necessity of a capable and largely non-corrupt state for reaching official goals
and delivering social services has been widely acknowledged in the political science
literature (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2011, 2013; Jänicke, Weidner,
and Jörgens 1997; Miller 2000; Rothstein 1998, 2011; Rothstein and Teorell 2008;
Sikkink 1991). However, it has barely entered the debate in environmental politics.
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Some scholars emphasize the critical “administrative function” of the state when
implementing environmental policies (Duit 2016), others similarly point out the
importance of “bureaucratic capacity” in reaching environmental goals (Ringquist
1993a, 1993b, 1995). However, a comprehensive empirical account of the rela-
tionship between state capacity and environmental outcomes, comparable to the
efforts testing the democracy-environment relationship, is absent. Large-N studies
on the ability of states to implement their tasks on the environment are limited to
the investigation of the effect of corruption on different environmental outcomes by
scholars in economics (see, for example, Cole 2007; Damania, Fredriksson, and List
2003; Fredriksson and Svensson 2003; Pellegrini 2011; Welsch 2004) or case studies
in political science (see, for example, Robbins 2000; Sundström 2015). These find-
ings uniformly suggest that corruption has a detrimental impact on environmental
quality. One of the major drawbacks of these studies, however, is that they do not
account for the role of regime type in their analysis, and therefore, overlook the
important set of institutions that shape environmental decision-making.
The strands of research examining the role of democracy and the role of different
elements of state capacity in environmental research have thus existed in paral-
lel, rarely intersecting, creating omitted variable bias and overestimation of the
effects of each of these two correlated phenomena (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006,
333). Few studies aiming to explain environmental outcomes account for both
democracy and state capacity simultaneously (for the few examples, see Pellegrini
and Gerlagh 2006; Sjöstedt and Jagers 2014), while the relationship between the
two different but interconnected sets of political institutions has received even less
attention. Despite the fact that low state capacity can disrupt the functioning of
democratic states, which would imply then that the effect of democracy is depen-
dent on state capacity, the link between democracy and state capacity in their
impact on the provision of public goods and services has been largely overlooked.
Only a few studies attempt to theorize the interdependent relationship between
the two and test their interaction in the production of public policy outcomes.
These studies focused on economic growth (Knutsen 2013), school enrollment, and
infant mortality (Hanson 2015), while in environmental political science research,
the interdependent relationship between democratic institutions and institutions
determining the ability of the state to implement official goals has been ignored
entirely.
This dissertation aims to address this research gap and examine how the in-
terplay between 1) democratic institutions that shape how the demand for en-
vironmental policies is articulated and 2) the quality of government that shapes
the implementation of these policies contributes to the supply of public goods and
services related to environmental sustainability. Modelling the interdependence
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between these two distinct but interconnected sets of political institutions that
guide the functioning the political system (Easton 1953; Eckersley 2004; Fukuyama
2013; Rothstein 2011) provides an opportunity to better understand the difference
in the performance of political systems in the delivery of public services, including
environmental protection. It accounts both for the rules that influence the rulers’
incentives to commit to environmental goals and the capacity of the state to deliver
the results.
16
3
Theoretical framework
3.1 Environmental sustainability
Ensuring sustainable development is central to human survival. On the one hand,
economic development is crucial for improving living conditions today and in the
near future. On the other hand, long-term economic development relies on limited
natural resources and therefore requires a balance that does not jeopardize the
ability to pursue economic development in the future, as this could undermine the
living conditions of future generations and even the continuity of humankind. The
first attempts to address the issue of sustainable development date back to 1972
when the United Nations member states came together in Stockholm to discuss the
challenge of pursuing economic development with limited natural resources. The
global discussions continued in 1987 when the Brundtland Report, “Our Common
Future”, by the World Commission on Environment and Development coined the
common understanding of the term. According to their widespread definition,
developing sustainably implies meeting the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED 1987).
Since then, countries around the globe have been continuously committing them-
selves to reaching various goals of sustainable development (UN Millenium Project
2005; United Nations 2015).
The concept of sustainable development rests upon three pillars, all deeply in-
terconnected (Figure 1). It entails ensuring people’s social and economic welfare
while protecting the environment and natural resources (Hansmann, Mieg, and
Frischknecht 2012). Apart from the fact that the three dimensions affect one an-
other, each of them is complex and deserves one or more dissertations for itself.
In this study, I focus in particular on environmental sustainability, which is con-
nected to, but distinct from, the other two pillars of sustainable development. It
implies the protection of ecological systems that support human life (Goodland
1995). The dependence of human life on environmental sustainability makes the
environmental element an essential core of the sustainable development concept
and it is a key reason why it became this dissertation’s focus.
Environmental sustainability is related to the protection of ecological systems
that support life to ensure their indefinite continuity. Human life depends on
the health of these systems for food, water, air, pollination, waste reduction, and
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Figure 1: Three pillars of sustainable development (SD)
other ecological services (Goodland 1995). Healthy ecological systems create en-
vironmental conditions in which it is possible for people to sustain good health,
including, for example, clean air free from harmful chemicals and particles, and
clean drinkable water. The quality of the environment thus relies on the health of
ecological systems. Protection of ecological systems and ensuring environmental
sustainability is human-centered and is mostly about sustaining the conditions in
which it is possible for the humankind to survive and “fulfil their needs” (Dryzek
1987). Understanding the causes of environmental destruction and the continuous
failure to commit to environmental goals and protect ecological systems requires
understanding the complex nature of ecological systems and the human environ-
ment as a whole, as this complexity has implications for environmental decision-
making.
3.1.1 Characteristics of environmental sustainability
Several of the characteristics of environmental problems, which stem from the
characteristics of ecological systems in the first place, affect peoples’ choices either
towards or away from environmental sustainability. Mapping these characteris-
tics of environmental problems can help compare environmental protection with
the alternatives, understand people’s choices, and situate national governments
among other actors in addressing environmental problems. Most importantly, such
mapping can help recognize processes within states conducive to overcoming the
challenges for decision-making that these characteristics create. Among the most
prominent characteristics of environmental sustainability, the existing literature
mentions the following.
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First, each ecosystem involves multiple components, such as air, water, soil, etc.
These components are inherently interconnected (Meadowcroft 2014; Rockström,
Steffen, Noone, Persson, Chapin, et al. 2009b), and therefore, environmental
problems relating to particular ecosystem components are also interconnected. For
example, concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, which affects
climate change, does not only depend on the intensity of anthropogenic emissions,
but also on the state of the forests and oceans that absorb carbon dioxide and
help the system to “clean up” (Rockström, Steffen, Noone, Persson, Chapin, et al.
2009a). As ecosystem components are interdependent, the causes of deteriorating
ecosystem health, as well as the consequences of different events, are difficult to
track.
Second, ecosystems respond slowly to human action. After actions towards im-
proving environmental sustainability are taken, it can take years before the results
of those actions become visible. For example, after the introduction of sulphur
dioxide (SO2) reduction measures, it took roughly 20 years before substantial
changes became observable and measurable. The response of the climate to the
reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions will take even longer (Gardiner 2011).
The slow-changing nature of such environmental outcomes makes changes in en-
vironmental conditions not immediately visible to decision-makers.1
Third, there is a large number of actors that have the power to affect ecological
systems (Ostrom 2009). These include, for example, resource users who are directly
involved in the extraction of natural resources, such as people who inhabit areas
close to the resource or private companies; green civil society organizations, which
aim to protect natural resources; national governments, which establish norms
of behaviour regarding natural resources; international organizations that guide
the choices of national governments; and often private firms, which can pollute
the environment. The health of ecosystems depends on the complex network of
interactions between actors on these multiple levels and their behavioral choices.
Fourth, each ecosystem component can perform multiple functions for humans.
On the one hand, using the framework of Ostrom and Ostrom (1977), a clean
water body can be considered a public good, providing a source of drinking water
for people, a habitat for river products (e.g., fish) that people can consume, and
supporting other ecosystem components, such as forests and soil. On the other
hand, it can be a common good, serving as a waterway for transportation, or
a dumping place for waste from production and sewage. Therefore, regulating a
1 By decision-makers in this section I imply all actors who have direct or indirect, short-term or
long-term impact on environmental quality – from ordinary people who decide on their actions
in their everyday lives, to polluting businesses, to rulers who decide on environmental policies.
These include both elected officials seeking re-election and authoritarian rules who seek mass
support.
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Table 1: Characteristics of environmental problems
Problem
characteristics
Some implications for
decision-making
Some implications for
management
Multiple sources of
the problem
Diluted responsibility.
Difficult to isolate effects of
human actions on the
environment from the effects
of factors external to human
control
Requires experts in
decision-making, awareness of
the breadth of the issue,
cooperation among agencies
dealing with different problem
components, and unification of
the competing goals
Slow response to
human action
Low visibility of results.
Requires long time horizons
Requires paying the
concentrated costs now for
future diffused benefits
Large number of
actors on multiple
levels
Diluted responsibility for
actions, difficult to hold any
of the actors accountable.
Requires coordination among
actors on all levels and
coherence in their goals
Multiple dimensions
of the problem
Diluted responsibility.
Requires awareness of the
breadth of the problem
Requires different management
approaches for solving different
dimensions of a single problem
Focus on preventing
destruction rather
than building
something new
Low visibility of results.
Requires long time horizons.
Requires solving collective
action dilemmas over resource
exploitation
single water body can require a diversity of approaches – one that ensures universal
access to a public good and its sustainability (e.g., clean water) and another that
is conducive to solving collective action in the “tragedy of the commons” (e.g.,
securing cooperation between emitters in reducing water waste) (Hardin 1968).
Fifth, tackling environmental problems and the provision of public goods re-
lated to environmental sustainability is often related to preventing future damage
rather than building something new. Prevention of future damage is needed to
ensure that environmental problems do not surpass “tipping points” – conditions
where ecological systems lose their resilience and shift to another (undefined) state
(Lenton et al. 2008). The problem is that tipping points for degrees of environ-
mental damage are rather vague or undefined. It is unclear as to which thresholds
actors must aim for and also how to avoid reaching these thresholds, as ecosystems
are interdependent and problems with one ecosystem component can spill over to
other ecosystem components (Rockström, Steffen, Noone, Persson, Chapin, et al.
2009a; Steffen et al. 2015). A focus on damage prevention, and especially the
unclear aims of prevention, contributes to low visibility of actions towards tackling
environmental problems.
These characteristics of ecological systems (listed in Table 1) can steer decision-
making away from tackling environmental problems, despite the recognition of
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their importance:
• Interconnectedness of ecosystems makes it difficult to isolate the effects of
human actions on the environment from the effects of factors exogenous to
human control. This makes it difficult to hold responsible actors accountable
and makes it easier for them to avoid punishment for actions harmful to the
environment.
• Slow response to human actions makes environmental problems or improve-
ments in environmental conditions belong to the uncertain future, presenting
people with the problem of concentrated costs and diffused benefits. While
the time to act is now, improvements in the health of the environment as
a result of human action taken today will only be evident to our uncertain
future selves or unknown future generations. This uncertainty of future out-
comes and invisibility of results today make people prioritize current problems
rather than uncertain future ones.
• Large number of actors dilutes the responsibility for actions taken towards
harming or preserving the environment, making it difficult to hold any of the
actors accountable. Ecological systems also surpass national borders, which
contributes to diluted sources of responsibility.
• Different ecosystem components that have the characteristics of public, pri-
vate, club or common goods, require different management approaches, as
human incentives for their use differ depending on rivalry and excludability
(Ostrom and Ostrom 1977). At the same time, multiple functions of environ-
mental components imply that even a single physical phenomenon can require
various management approaches (Holzinger 2001).
Environmental issues share many of these characteristics with other aspects of
human welfare. Interconnectedness of environmental problem components can be
related to the problem of societal inequalities that stem from many sources. Slow
response and invisibility of environmental problems are features also inherent in,
for example, pension programs. The global character of some environmental prob-
lems can also be related to the problems of migration. Prevention of environmental
degradation can be compared to the maintenance of already existing infrastruc-
ture. Just as with natural resource protection, provision of many public services
also requires solving collective action problems in tax collection in order to generate
budgets for these services.
While the characteristics of environmental issues are not necessarily unique in
the way they affect decision-making, their combination poses a challenge that is
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rare for other types of societal problems. On the one hand, ensuring environmental
sustainability is highly dependent on the choices of those actors involved in collec-
tive action dilemmas regarding the use of natural resources, i.e. to cooperate and
not overexploit a common good. On the other hand, it depends on the universal
provision of public services to an undefined constituency (Falkemark 1999). Only
in the case of extreme and visible environmental problems do interests to protect
the environment become vested interests, convenient to address through politics.
Otherwise, environmental protection only brings diffused benefits. Taken together,
the characteristics of environmental problems accumulate into the problems of in-
visibility and diluted responsibility. Both of these problems have implications for
the decision-making of both the actors involved in preserving the common good
and governments responsible for the provision of public services.
This combination of characteristics makes environmental problems inherently
complex and it is unlikely that collective action for coping with ecological prob-
lems will take place voluntarily. Management of such complex ecosystems, which
affect one another, depend on the actions of multiple actors at many levels and
transcend national and generational boundaries, requires systematic coordination
from a legitimate and credible enforcer that can effectively coordinate and mobilize
systematic knowledge about the complexity of the issues, use it, and ensure general
long-term commitment to sustainability. The state is so far the only actor that is
potentially capable of taking on this complex coordinating role. Additionally, the
state plays a key role in providing public services aimed at environmental protec-
tion and reaching environmental sustainability goals, when compared to private
actors or end users themselves.
Outlining environmental characteristics serves a dual goal. First, it helps em-
phasize the essential role of the state in tackling environmental problems as op-
posed to local self-management or international environmental regimes. Second, it
lays the ground for further introduction of how democracy and quality of govern-
ment are fit to address the implications of environmental problem characteristics
for environmental decision-making and management.
3.2 The role of the state in achieving environmental sus-
tainability
The state has been conceptualized as a form of political organization of people
with “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”,
functioning under a single system of government (Weber 1946, emphasis added).
With the legitimate power to exert coercion on its territory, the state is a crucial
actor in achieving environmental sustainability goals.
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At low levels of environmental problem complexity, for example, when the num-
ber of actors is low and they are involved in managing a single resource (i.e., a
forest or a pond), it is easier for such actors to coordinate cooperation. Elinor
Ostrom has emphasized that local self-management and control in this case can
help reach sustainable natural resource use under eight conditions/principles that
should guide the interaction among resource users. These principles include: clear
group boundaries, existence of rules that match local needs, participation of re-
source users in decision-making, respect of the local rules of resource use by outside
authorities, monitoring by resource users, existence of sanctions, and availability
of means for conflict resolution. Under these principles, Ostrom argued, there is a
high chance that resource users will cooperate in collective action for maintaining
the sustainability of the ecosystems they manage (Ostrom 1990, 2010). While
these rules can predict successful collective action in relatively small groups, they
seem to face a number of challenges when the group size increases (Ostrom et al.
1999).
As the number of actors grows, their interactions become more complex and
it becomes more difficult for them to monitor each other’s behavior (Agrawal
and Goyal 2001). Additionally, as the area they manage expands, the interaction
between ecosystems and their components becomes more complex. As a result,
understanding of the environmental problems might diverge between different ac-
tors while the outcomes of actors’ actions become less visible and more difficult to
track. As their incentives to free-ride increase, successful collective action becomes
less likely.
In order to achieve collective action on a large scale in such complex matters as
environmental protection, there appears to be a need to coordinate the behavior
of actors and to set rules to regulate their collective choices. National governments
have an inherent and (ideally) legitimate power to do this. By adopting laws and
regulations applicable to the entire country’s territory, a state’s government has
the power to perform the function of a “third party” that can guide the actions
of actors, monitor their behavior and enforce solutions favorable to environmental
sustainability (Mansbridge 2014). As most of the interactions between resource
users and the other actors that affect ecosystems are complex and interconnected,
and as environmental sustainability issues are complex in themselves, the state
needs to intervene in governing the ecosystems to direct the behavior of the ac-
tors operating within its territory and to guide their choices towards sustainable
development.
Apart from creating and maintaining legal frameworks and formal institutions
that guide the behavior of local actors in managing common-pool resources, states
are also key figures in solving global environmental issues. Within the structure of
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global environmental governance, which consists of international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), such as Greenpeace or the World Wide Fund for Nature,
transnational business corporations, such as Siemens or Johnson&Johnson, the
supranational European Union and international organizations such as the United
Nations or the World Trade Organization, states might seem invisible. However, it
is ultimately up to states whether to create supra- and international organizations,
whether to sign or not sign international agreements and whether to follow or not
follow their guidance in domestic political decisions. Domestically, national gov-
ernments can develop and uphold legal frameworks, gather and disseminate knowl-
edge about environmental issues through, for example, introduction of mandatory
ecology classes in schools; they can employ administrative measures, such as tax-
ation, fines, and other policy instruments, as well as provide an arena to resolve
environmental conflicts (Duit 2014, 2016; Duit, Feindt, and Meadowcroft 2016).
Through these functions states can influence the behavior of corporations, NGOs,
and local resource users operating on their territories. They can both facilitate the
shift towards environmental sustainability and hamper it. States can also greatly
facilitate or hamper non-state initiatives, such as sharing economy projects in local
communities, the work of non-governmental organizations in advocating environ-
mental interests, and the development of environmentally-friendly practices by
businesses.
Another key function of states in achieving environmental sustainability is the
provision of public services and welfare related to the environment to their cit-
izens. As many of the ecosystem components have the characteristics of public
goods (such as clean water or air), it is the state’s task to ensure their redistri-
bution among the citizens. Individual initiatives to install private water wells or
air filters are unlikely to suffice in solving water quality or air quality problems
on a large scale. At the same time, left to their own devices, private markets can
lack incentives to engage in the provision of environmental public goods due to the
high risk of externalities – situations in which individuals can enjoy the benefits
of receiving a good (e.g., a clean environment) without choosing to enjoy the ben-
efits and pay for them (Fairbrother 2016a). By collecting taxes, governments can
acquire the means necessary to provide environmental public goods and engage in
the large-scale expensive implementation of projects with high externalities. While
markets benefit from individual monetary exchanges and lose from externalities,
governments, on the contrary, can benefit from them, as they can get the support
of a larger proportion of the population to stay in power. This makes state govern-
ments more likely to engage in the provision of environmental public goods than
the markets.
Thus, the state has the power to address the environmental problems that
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Figure 2: Political system by Easton (1953), amended
stem from both the common-good characteristics of the ecosystem components,
by shaping the interaction of actors around common-pool resources and having
the potential to resolve problems related to free-riding (Mansbridge 2014), and
the public-good characteristics of the ecosystem components, by providing envi-
ronmental public goods and supporting their redistribution (Duit, Feindt, and
Meadowcroft 2016). At the same time, the state is a “significant node” in the
network of international environmental governance (Eckersley 2005, 159), a key
negotiating party, with the power to bring international decisions into action by
ratifying international environmental treaties.
While the role of the state has been acknowledged in environmental politics re-
search (Barry and Eckersley 2005a; Duit 2014; Eckersley 2004), we still know very
little about what makes states take on environmental challenges and reach environ-
mental goals. Therefore, the state remains a “black box” in environmental politics
research. Unpacking this “black box” and looking into the functioning of the po-
litical systems of states, can help identify factors beneficial for pro-environmental
decision-making and the setting and reaching of environmental goals.
In 1953, Easton suggested looking at the functioning of states through the lens
of system analysis. Figure 2 depicts the original idea, with slight modifications.
According to Easton’s system-view of political life, political decisions depend on
demands from the “organized effort” of society to address them in a top-down
manner (Easton 1953) and the support of a political system that underpins the
legitimacy of decision-making. For example, the demand for environmental protec-
tion can drive decision-making towards environmental sustainability, while support
for the organization of the political system favors legitimacy of environmental laws
and regulations created by government. Decisions translate into the outputs of the
political system in the form of laws and regulations and have direct consequences
for the society as they shape the behavior of citizens and organizations operating
within the territory in which the state maintains legal jurisdiction.
To understand how different political systems respond to environmental chal-
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lenges we need to study the institutions or “rules of the game” (North 1990, 3)
that shape the functioning of the inputs and outputs of the political systems, i.e.
guide the making of political decisions and their implementation. For the moment,
we still lack empirical evidence as to which political institutions favor countries’
environmental commitments and make countries reach favorable environmental
outcomes, and still have much to learn about how a state should be governed in
order to achieve environmental sustainability.
The view of the political system suggested by Easton (1953) is helpful to un-
derstand the formation of the political will or the functioning on the “input”-side
of the political system. However, it does not seem to acknowledge the presence
of the state apparatus in the production of public policy outcomes and there-
fore overlooks the importance of characteristics that shape the functioning of the
“output”-side of the political system. In the next sections, I take Easton’s view of
political life as a point of departure, as it provides a useful framework for outlining
previous research on the relationship between democracy and environmental out-
comes. In the sections that follow, however, I also add an additional component
to the drawing of the political system that is missing from Easton’s model – the
state apparatus and the institutions that guide its functioning.
3.3 Democracy and environmental sustainability
To advance our understanding of the governing rules and principles that facilitate
countries’ progress on the path towards sustainability, we, first of all, have to turn
to institutions that are favorable for pro-environmental decision-making and shape
the “input”-side of the political system (see Figures 2 and 3). One of the largest
debates in this research domain concerns which type of political regime is beneficial
for the environment: democracy or authoritarian rule.
Minimally defined, democracy or “the rule of the people” is a combination of
institutions that secures free elections and representative government. According
to Dahl (1989, 233), this set of institutions includes frequent free and fair elections
to the government, universal suffrage, freedom for citizens to form and participate
in political parties or civil society organizations, freedom of expression, particularly
freedom to openly criticize officials and the government, availability of alternative
sources of information not controlled by the government, freedom to run for public
office, and a constitutional guarantee that government officials that execute control
over decision- and policy-making are elected. Authoritarian rule, on the contrary,
implies a form of government with power concentrated in the hands of a single
leader or small elite. In an athoritarian system, responsibility to the people is
not necessarily secured by a constitution. In this dissertation, I refer to different
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Contingent on the regime type
Figure 3: Political institutions that shape the input-side of the political
system
regimes types as being both in a dichotomy and as the opposite ends of the same
scale, with low levels of democracy referring to non-democratic (authoritarian)
regimes.
Democratic or authoritarian governing principles ultimately determine the rules
of preference aggregation within a polity2 and for the large part shape how the
rest of the decision-making procedures are designed. Naturally, within politi-
cal regimes, there are many nuances in terms of decision-making processes. The
structural organization of government, such as the number of veto points and
players, determines the complexity of the decision-making process; the form of
the relationship between the state and society defines the rules for interest group
representation; while whether the form of government is presidential or parlia-
mentary, and the extent of the representation of different interests in the parlia-
ment (e.g., green parties), influences the balance of powers in decision-making.
All of these factors affect decision-making in general and there is some existing
research on how they play out for environmental decision-making in particular
(Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007; Jänicke 2005; Knill, Debus, and Heichel 2010;
Muller-Rommel and Poguntke 2002; Neumayer 2003; Scruggs 2001; Siaroff 1999).
In this dissertation, however, I do not go into the details of the decision-making
process, but rather focus on regime type as a set of overarching principles guiding
these processes. The next sections and Table 2 summarize the main arguments
as to why democratic institutions can be both beneficial and detrimental for the
environment.
2 In democracies, the preferences of numerous interest groups are aggregated through the pro-
cesses of representation. In authoritarian regimes, these are the preferences of a dictator
and/or the narrow elite that are aggregated in decision-making. While the term “preference
aggregation” is more common to describe decision-making in democracies, it is helpful to apply
it to the authoritarian regimes when comparing decision-making in both regime types, to set
a common baseline for the comparison.
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3.3.1 Why democracy can be “good” for the environment
Democracy has been argued to favor environmental commitments in solving both
global and local environmental problems, for a number of reasons.3 First, demo-
cratic institutions provide the necessary means for increasing public awareness
about environmental issues. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press al-
low media outlets to inform the population about environmental problems and
expose environmental issues as political failures. Freedom of association provides
opportunities for environmental interest groups to organize into non-governmental
organizations and to inform the public through their educational campaigns. En-
vironmentally aware people are more likely to make pro-environmental decisions in
their daily lives and and to give their votes to parties that address environmental
issues in their programs.
Democracies are more likely to have environmental issues on their political
agenda than authoritarian regimes due to their openness to a variety of inter-
ests. Freedom of expression and association allows environmental interest groups
to organize for protests against environmental degradation as well as to lobby for
their interests politically. These activities facilitate the penetration of environ-
mental issues into political programs and thus influence political decision-making.
Freedom of party organization also allows environmental interest groups to form
green political parties and to bring their interests into comprehensive policy pro-
grams. Democracies are also more cooperative in international environmental
agreements and tend to comply with international environmental treaties, ratifying
their prescriptions in domestic legislation (Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Neumayer
2002; Weiss and Jacobson 1999). The environmental preferences of the population
aggregate through votes in free and fair elections and help parties and politicians
with environmental issues covered in their programs get into the political arena.
The possibility of public deliberation on environmental problems allows pro-
environmental arguments to come to the surface and to take into account citizens’
preferences beyond elections (Baber and Bartlett 2005; Dryzek 2000; Smith 2003).
Citizen and interest group engagement in discussion and argumentation provides
constant feedback and allows for better integration of the societies’ environmental
views and values in the decision-making process. This makes deliberative democ-
racy a good fit to face up to the complexity of environmental problems (Dryzek
1990).
Through free and fair elections, which are a necessary attribute of democracy,
citizens can also hold politicians accountable for not delivering on their promises to
3 For a comprehensive account of the main arguments on how democratic institutions can affect
the environment, see, e.g., Li and Reuveny (2006); Spilker (2013); Bernauer and Koubi (2009);
Sjöstedt and Jagers (2014).
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address environmental problems, and can give their votes to alternative candidates.
Such accountability mechanisms increase the likelihood that rulers will be more
responsive to the environmental concerns of the population (Sen 1999).
Democracies are also believed to finance public policies more than less free
political systems as the size of the “winning coalition”, whose preferences need
to be addressed in policy-making, is larger (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). By aiming
to please a large proportion of the electorate in order to win votes, democratic
rulers are more likely to extend social welfare universally and deliver public goods,
including environmental quality, among other benefits (McGuire 2010). It is simply
more efficient for leaders in democracies to provide public goods and services rather
than to engage in tit-for-tat exchanges and buy the support of the majority with
private goods (Lake and Baum 2001). This mechanism is especially relevant for
environmental problems of a local character.
3.3.2 Why democracy can be “bad” for the environment
Some characteristics of democratic institutions, however, are also believed to ham-
per the adoption of environmental policies. Despite the pluralistic nature of democ-
racies, strong corporate interest groups can gain high influence over the political
decision-making process. Politicians may become compelled to respond to the
short-term interests of these groups, which can go against environmental protection
concerns (Dryzek 1992), instead of the long-term preferences of the public, if any
(e.g., Bättig and Bernauer 2009). Liberal values cultivated in modern democracies
can go against environmental values and aggregate through elections into govern-
ment programs that oppose rather than favor environmental protection (Dobson
2000). Liberal democratic ideals might also limit support for government inter-
vention in domestic affairs (Mathews 1995). However, in achieving sustainable
natural resource use, (legitimate) state coercion is needed to enforce compliance
in collective action (Mansbridge 2014).
Additionally, some characteristics of public policies related to environmental
sustainability are not compatible with some of the features inherent to democratic
institutions. A particular attribute of environmental sustainability as a public
policy outcome is that actual benefits from policy actions taken towards envi-
ronmental sustainability may become visible or measurable only years after these
actions have taken place (see section 3.1.1). Therefore, addressing environmental
sustainability involves one of the greatest political challenges: the need to make
decisions today that are beneficial for people in the distant future and people who
are not yet born. Commitment towards environmental sustainability thus requires
decision-makers to have long time horizons.
Time horizons can be understood as a “distance into the future to which a
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decision-maker looks when evaluating consequences of a proposed action” (Ebert
and Piehl 1973, 35). If the time horizon of decision-makers is too short, they
may undervalue returns from the project. The optimum decision requires that the
time horizon of decision-makers is suited to the time characteristics of the factors
in the decision. In politics, time horizons influence the behavior and choices of
political leaders and determine whether planning is made for the long or short
term. Short-sighted decision-makers tend to prioritize policies that ensure quick
delivery of results, while rulers with long-term thinking are more likely to finance
policies that produce visible results after a longer time lag. As ecosystems are
slow-responding to human action, the problematique of time horizons is one of the
biggest challenges for democracies. An optimal case requires time horizons long
enough to match the slow response of environmental outcomes to policy change.
However, due to constant political challenges arising from electoral cycles, political
leaders in democracies are likely to be short-sighted, which can prevent them from
allocating budget resources to the implementation of such long-term policy projects
as environmental protection (Congleton 1992). In addition, capitalist markets that
tend to discount the future and liberal democratic values mutually reinforce short
time horizons.
As many environmental outcomes, such as relative decrease in emissions or pro-
tection of a distant forest, might not be directly visible after policy interventions,
it can be difficult for people to hold governments accountable for the lack of pro-
environmental decision-making or effective implementation. Besides, many envi-
ronmental outcomes also depend on causes exogenous to government control, such
as forest fires that affect the condition of forests, biodiversity, and air quality, or oil
spills that affect the health of marine ecosystems. Such environmental complexity
makes it difficult to isolate the effect of government action on the actual outcome,
even if the outcome is observable, by concealing government efforts in delivering
the goods (Harding and Stasavage 2013; Mani and Mukand 2007). It makes it diffi-
cult for the public to judge government efforts in environmental protection as such
judgements are based only on their experiences. In democracies, low visibility of
environmental outcomes negatively affects public demand for government action,
and without such demand, even a responsive government will have few incentives
to address environmental issues. Low visibility and the long-term response of the
environment to policy actions provides constant incentive for democratic rulers to
focus on other public policies that yield short-term results, rather than to focus
on such long-term commitments as pro-environmental policies, simply to make it
easier for the public to evaluate government actions.
Empirical evidence for the democracy-environment link is ambiguous. Some
studies find a positive relationship between the two, others – no association at
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Table 2: Democracy and the environment, some of the main mechanisms
summarized
Mechanisms of positive influence Mechanisms of negative influence
•Likely provision of public goods
(incl. environmental public goods)
to win support of broad masses
•Accountability through elections for pro-
environmental interests
•Freedom of media can raise public
awareness about environmental issues
•Openness to a variety of interests,
including environmental interests
•Openness to a variety of interests,
including businesses
•Short time horizons promoted by
electoral cycles
all, while a few even report a negative effect of democracy on the environment
(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Bernauer and Koubi 2009;
Fredriksson and Wollscheid 2007; Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2003; Li and Reuveny
2006; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002; Sjöstedt and Jagers 2014; Spilker 2013).
Moreover, the reported effects differ between the different outcomes and sample
sizes used in the analyses. The important limitation of the majority of empirical
studies examining the effect of democracy on environmental outcomes, however, is
that they fail to account for the effect of institutions that shape implementation of
environmental policies, leaving a lot of variation in the performance of democracies
unmodelled. While we can expect that there is an effect of democracy on environ-
mental decision-making, the fact of decisions for environmental sustainability does
not automatically guarantee that these decisions will be implemented. The deci-
sion to protect the environment and the actual observable outcome are separated
by the chain of implementation processes, and the success of environmental policies
also depends on the ability of the state to implement the official goals (Skocpol
1985). The quality of the public administration that implements the decisions,
and of the institutions that shape the implementation processes to a large extent
determine whether the state is able to introduce and apply the appropriate policy
instruments, as well as to ensure monitoring and enforcement (Howlett, Ramesh,
and Perl 2009). Such a well-functioning apparatus, however, is not necessarily an
attribute of democratic systems. As Huntington (1991, 9–10) notes:
Governments produced by elections may be: inefficient, corrupt, short-
sighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of
adopting policies demanded by the public good. These make such gov-
ernments undesirable but they do not make them undemocratic. (. . . )
[Therefore,] democracy [should be] clearly distinguished from other char-
acteristics of political systems.
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3.4 Quality of government and environmental sustainabil-
ity
Reaching observable and tangible results in environmental sustainability requires
not only the adoption of environmental policies, but also their sound implementa-
tion. Therefore, apart from the rules and principles that shape pro-environmental
decision-making, it is crucial to understand the institutions that favor the im-
plementation of these political decisions and the actual delivery of environmental
outcomes (see Figure 4). The ability of governments to implement official goals
and deliver public goods and services (including a healthy environment), has been
broadly defined as “state capacity” (Skocpol 1985, 9). While the term “capacity”
is comprehensive and useful for a general discussion regarding state capabilities, it
is quite problematic for building a theoretical framework for further quantitative
analysis. “Capacity” is a broad multi-dimensional concept and it is more useful as
an umbrella term for a number of factors rather than as a factor in itself.
The factors under the “capacity” umbrella can differ depending on “the official
goals” that a government sets out to reach. The means of implementation can
vary between different goals as certain conditions/institutions might be necessary
for achieving some goals but not necessary for achieving others. For reaching
some official goals, some argue, certain forms of corruption can be functional. In
low state capacity settings, when public officials lack adequate official salaries,
bribery can incentivize officials to actually provide certain services because they
get income from service recipients. Similarly, ethnic favoritism or clientelism can
favor the delivery of targeted or means-tested goods (Huntington 1968; Walton
2013; Zarazaga 2014). However, in the provision of environmental public goods
or implementation of other programmes that require long-term implementation,
there are few reasons to believe that any such form of corruption can be beneficial.
For example, while a corrupt clientelistic state can have the capacity to deliver
distributive goods, such as water pipes or boreholes, to the target population, this
“short-term capacity” would not be enough to guarantee the maintenance of these
water pipes and boreholes or for ensuring that the quality of water is high enough
to be safe to drink. In this section, I attempt to summarize the conditions that
are particularly conducive to the implementation of environmental sustainability
programs and in this way conceptualize the “capacity” of the state required to
reach environmental goals.
Capacity to implement long-term projects with universal coverage, such as envi-
ronmental sustainability, depends on institutions that can ensure continuous, unin-
terrupted implementation of environmental policies over a long period of time, and
also shape the incentives of civil servants and decision-makers towards long-term
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Output Outcomeactions
Contingent on the quality of government
Figure 4: Political institutions that shape the output-side of the political
system
projects. These institutions pertain to rules favorable for the effective performance
of public administration, which designs and implements policies, the rule of law
to secure implementation of long-sighted environmental laws against short-term
interests, and the absence of corruption, in both grand and petty forms, as cor-
ruption is both an effect and a cause of short-sightedness (Charron and Lapuente
2010, 2011; Rothstein, Samanni, and Teorell 2012). Following the tradition set
by Rothstein (2011), I refer to this combination of factors as “quality of govern-
ment”(QoG), which is broadly connected to state capacity; however, it not only
accounts for whether the state can reach its goals but also “how” it reaches them
(Hanson and Sigman 2013; Rothstein 1998).
3.4.1 Bureaucratic capacity and environmental sustainability
Any public policy benefits from a public administration capable of implementing
the set tasks. However, a well-functioning civil service is not a necessary con-
dition for reaching some types of policy goals. For example, provision of highly
visible, targeted and means-tested goods and services, such as selective building
of road infrastructure, parks, medical or education facilities, might not necessarily
require a strong public administration. Rulers can deliver the goods relatively
quickly through clientelistic and vote-buying strategies, using the contracting or
targeting efforts of politicized agencies. Policies aimed at achieving environmental
sustainability, however, have low visibility, require long-term commitments, and
inherently target the broad, public masses. Carrying out such public policy pro-
grams inevitably relies on a strong public administration, capable of undertaking
complex tasks and committing to long-term implementation.
The strength and capabilities of a public administration, it is argued, depend on
formal and informal rules that shape the selection and motivation of civil servants
(e.g., Dahlström and Holmgren 2017; Evans and Rauch 1999; Miller 2000; Weber
1978). These rules are related to the employment of civil servants, their protection
from political influence, the guarantee of fair salaries, and the predictability of
their careers. The “ideal” Weberian model of a capable bureaucracy prescribes
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meritocratic recruitment, autonomy of the public administration from politics, and
a predictable career ladder, which provides long-term rewards for civil servants,
including long-term salaries (Weber 1978). These conditions are beneficial for the
implementation of environmental policies in a number of ways.
Meritocratic recruitment, through formal examination or selection by educa-
tion, increases the likelihood that the chosen employees will be competent in their
duties (Dahlström and Holmgren 2017). As many environmental issues are in-
terconnected, environmental sustainability projects require high competence of
civil servants and awareness of the breadth of environmental problems. The issue
requires well-developed and thought-through action plans that aim at long-term
maintenance and bring long-term results. Incompetent agency heads, who often
end up in top positions due to connections with political leaders, might be inca-
pable of developing such long-term programs, which are able to account for the
breadth of the issue. On the contrary, competent professionals, using their knowl-
edge and experience, are more likely to develop effective action plans that match
the complexity of environmental issues.
Level of expertise also affects the day-to-day performance of the public admin-
istration. Higher competence increases the chances that a public official has the
knowledge required for the job and/or decreases the time needed for learning the
necessary skills. Incompetence also decreases the incentives of civil servants to
comply with policy goals, as they recognize that their ability to implement these
policies is limited (Huber and McCarty 2004).
Meritocratic recruitment additionally helps generate esprit de corps (from
French: “group spirit”), as individuals will get the impression of shared knowledge
and abilities with their colleagues. This helps civil servants develop similar goals,
which in turn favors coherence within public administration structures (Evans
and Rauch 1999). Meritocratically employed civil servants, whose job depends
not on political leaders but rather on their own job performance, are also more
likely to develop incentives towards professional goals rather than opportunistic
behavior. This, overall, stimulates effectiveness in implementation of public
policies, including environmental policies (Dahlström and Holmgren 2017, 15;
Ujhelyi 2014).
In contrast to employment by merit, political appointments to positions within
the public administration are argued to destabilize it and undermine the perfor-
mance of civil servants. Political appointments often result in a high turnover of
agency heads, creating “leadership vacuums”, and thereby obscuring agency goals
(Lewis 2007). This leads both to incoherence within the implementation bodies as
well as the inability of civil servants to actually commit to implementation under
the unstable leadership (Cornell 2014). Incoherence and inability to commit are
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detrimental to such long-term and complex projects as environmental sustainabil-
ity programs.
A predictable career ladder and material incentives create motivation for civil
servants to stay within the government and thus increase competence over time.
Attractive employment conditions also decrease staff turnover and prevent the loss
of institutional memory; they lengthen the time horizons of civil servants and re-
duce their incentives to engage in corrupt practices for personal short-term gain
(Cornell 2014; Evans and Rauch 1999). The competence and reliability of civil
servants contribute to building high bureaucratic capacity, which increases the
likelihood that the state will be able to implement policies (Dahlström, Lindvall,
and Rothstein 2013). High turnover and loss of institutional memory are detrimen-
tal to the implementation of such long-term projects as environmental policies, as
they might disrupt the implementation of initiatives before any results are reached.
3.4.2 Rule of law, corruption and environmental sustainability
The rule of law is another aspect of governmental quality crucial for the committed
implementation of such long-term projects as environmental sustainability policies,
which have diffused benefits and often intangible results. The concept of rule of
law is highly debated in the literature, yet most of the definitions build upon two
basic premises: “that people should obey the law and be ruled by it” as well as “the
government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it” (Møller and Skaaning 2012;
Raz 1979, 212). While the first building block refers to the obedience to the law
by the general public, the second dimension implies “equality under the law before
the courts” (Skaaning 2010). In other words, rule of law implies that “the rules
are binding even on the most powerful political actor, the state itself” (Fukuyama
2014b, 1327). Compliance with the laws by the general public and private actors
is necessary for achieving the environmental goals set by governments. At the
same time, governments’ obedience to the law and equality of all actors under the
law before the courts secures commitments to policy objectives (Fukuyama 2014b;
Møller and Skaaning 2012; Raz 1979; Skaaning 2010). For rulers, there is often
an incentive to divert budget resources from long-term policy programs to policies
that bring immediate outcomes and that build legitimacy in the short term. If
the rule of law is sufficiently weak, this incentive is easier to put into action. The
degree of the rule of law also influences the capacity of the state to enforce laws,
which is crucial to (quasi-) voluntary compliance and the cooperation of actors in
collective action dilemmas over natural resource protection.
Under weak rule of law, it is also easier for public officials to misuse their office
for private gain and engage in corruption, which is detrimental to long-term envi-
ronmental policy goals for a number of reasons. First, corruption decreases states’
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Table 3: QoG and the environment, some of the main mechanisms
summarized
Component Mechanisms
QoG
Corruption
•Disrupts coercive capacity •Knowledge that policies are
likely to be implemented can
affect citizens’ demand
for policies
•Knowledge that policies are
likely to be implemented
affects incentives of
politicians to adopt policies
•Lengthens time horizons of
politicians (*e.g.,* through
checks and balances) and
thus can compensate for
invisibility of environmental
problems
•Lengthens time horizons of
citizens (also, often through
providing economic security)
and thus can compensate for
invisibility of environmental
problems
•Disrupts extractive capacity
•Hampers voluntary
compliance
•Makes it easier for special
interests to gain political
influence
•Indirect impact through
economic growth
Bureaucratic
quality
•Impacts quality of policies -
better action plans
•Lengthens institutional
memory
•Implies coherence within
bureaucracy
•Better day-to-day
performance of bureaucrats
Rule of law
•Contributes to the strength
of environmental laws
•Can reduce influence of
special interests over politics
•Increases compliance with
laws
coercive power. If public administration is corrupt then regulations are rarely
followed and ultimately environmental laws do not get implemented (Damania,
Fredriksson, and List 2003; López and Mitra 2000). There are few incentives for
emitters, illegal loggers or poachers to comply with regulations if they can offer
a bribe to government officials and pay their way out of the prescribed codes of
behaviour instead (Desai 1998; O’Connor 1994). From their side, orrupt inspec-
tors may take bribes and, for example, underreport emissions, allow illegal logging,
overfishing and poaching instead of punishing the wrongdoers with fines and en-
forcing compliance with the standards (Damania 2002; Robbins 2000; Sundström
2015).
Second, corruption hampers voluntary compliance by decreasing trust in the
government and fellow citizens (Delhey and Newton 2005; Dinesen 2013; Richey
2010; Rothstein 2009; Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Lack of trust in government
diminishes public support for government interventions, including support for var-
ious policy instruments needed to launch implementation of policies and secure
compliance (Fairbrother 2016b, 2017; Harring and Rönnerstrand 2016). Not being
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able to trust that the government can successfully enforce laws, actors have few
incentives to comply with them voluntarily. At the same time, lack of trust that
others follow the regulations decreases actors’ incentives to obey.
Third, corruption, by decreasing trust in governments and general trust, also
affects people’s support for and proneness to pay the taxes that could poten-
tially contribute to the environmental budget (e.g., Fairbrother 2016b, Fairbrother
(2017); Hammar and Jagers 2006; Harring 2013; Harring and Jagers 2013). If cit-
izens do not trust that the government can spend their tax contributions wisely
there are few incentives for them to contribute. At the same time, if citizens be-
lieve that their fellow citizens do not pay taxes, there will also be few incentives
for them to pay (Hammar, Jagers, and Nordblom 2009). Additionally, in a cor-
rupt polity, public revenues can be diverted from their target purpose and enrich
government officials instead. In such a manner, corruption also diminishes the
extractive capacity of the state.
Fourth, in a corrupt system, it is easier for special interests to gain political influ-
ence. The business interests of polluting industries often contradict environmental
sustainability goals. A corrupt system provides an opportunity for businesses to
bribe policy-makers and push their interests through to decision-making (Wilson
and Damania 2005). If judges are not independent and are subject to political
influence or can be bribed, it is easier for such powerful interest groups to impose
their preferences on judges and override environmental laws.
Fifth, corruption can affect environmental sustainability indirectly, through its
negative impact on economic growth (Mauro 1995). Studies expect that corruption
can decrease pollution at lower levels of economic development by obstructing the
growth of industries, as well as increase pressure on the environment in high-income
countries by preventing investment in green technologies (Cole 2007; Welsch 2004).
Corruption also interferes in the hiring process of government officials and thus
affects competence levels and the level of commitment to policy objectives, leading
to inadequate inspections and poor enforcement (Ringquist 1993a), while corrupt
civil servants simply have fewer incentives to implement policies (Huber and Mc-
Carty 2004).
All three aspects of governmental quality relevant to the environmental com-
mitments of countries – strength of the public administration, rule of law, and
corruption – interact, affecting one another in multiple ways. Rule of law is inti-
mately connected with corruption, as discussed earlier in this section. Meritocratic
employment in public administration has been said to reduce corruption while po-
litical appointments have been argued to provoke it (Dahlström and Holmgren
2017). At the same time, stronger rule of law can enforce meritocratic employ-
ment rules, while weak rule of law intensifies political influence over public admin-
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istration. Taken together, these factors can give a comprehensive idea of whether
policies are likely to get implemented in countries or not. Collectively, the im-
pression of a well-functioning state can also affect a ruler’s incentives for policy
commitments as well as the demand for environmental protection from the citi-
zens. Confidence that the state is able to commit to long-term projects, not steal
the resources collected by taxes, combined with the economic security that usually
comes with higher governmental quality, can positively affect citizens’ demands
for environmental protection (see Table 3). Therefore, by securing implemen-
tation and facilitating the development of citizens’ demands for environmental
action, quality of government can to some extent compensate for the obstacles to
pro-environmental decision-making created by the low visibility of environmental
problems.
Empirical large-N studies investigating the relationship between the quality of
government (or its different aspects) and the environment are limited to the stud-
ies investigating the relationship between corruption and environmental outcomes.
The studies uniformly find a negative effect of corruption on different environmen-
tal outcomes, implying that higher corruption has a detrimental effect on environ-
mental quality (see e.g., Cole 2007; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006; Welsch 2004).
3.5 Hypothesizing the interaction between democracy and
quality of government
“While a virtual industry has sprung up in the past generation analyzing
the correlates of democracy with just about everything, one of the most
understudied and undertheorized relationships is that between democracy
and the state” (Fukuyama 2014b, 1326)
In order to reach environmental sustainability targets, states need to both adopt
environmental policies and secure their implementation. Therefore, to understand
political system characteristics favorable for reaching environmental goals, we need
to consider the institutions that shape both of these processes (Figure 5).
As previous chapters suggest, the adoption and implementation of policies are
shaped by distinct sets of political institutions. Institutions that shape political
decision-making and preference aggregation guide the functioning of the input-side
of the political system and pertain to the regime type, i.e. the democratic or au-
thoritarian “rules of the game”. The degree to which the “rules of the game” are
democratic determines the extent to which the elections are free and fair, represen-
tation is wide, expression is free, alternative sources of information are available,
and the freedom of association in political parties and civil societies organizations
is developed (Dahl 1989). These rules relate to access to political power and have
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Figure 5: Political institutions that shape the input and output of the
political system
little to do with the actual exercise of power, which is connected to the implemen-
tation of policies and actual delivery of public policy outcomes (Rothstein 2011;
Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Institutions that shape the implementation of po-
litical decisions instead guide the functioning of the output-side of the political
system and pertain to the quality of government, which encompasses, broadly, the
absence of corruption, the rule of law and the administrative capacity of the state.
Thus, democratic institutions, that shape the functioning of the input-side of
the political system, and governmental quality, that shapes the functioning of
the output-side of the political system, interact in the production of outcomes
(Fukuyama 2014b). There are reasons to expect that quality of government shapes
how democratic regimes perform (Fukuyama 2014a). It is also plausible that
governmental quality plays out differently for policy outcomes within different
regime types.
One of the most explicit connections between the two sets of political institu-
tions is the link between democracy and administrative apparatus. Democracy
and public administration are connected through the channels of politicians’ ac-
countability to the electorate: to get re-elected, democratic leaders need to deliver
on their promises. To deliver, they need a well-functioning public administration
ready to serve their interests (Behn 1998). For this reason, recruitment to public
agencies is often politicized. Political appointments to the public administration
and the capacity of public administration to perform the assigned tasks, however,
do not necessarily go hand in hand. Although some argue that political appoint-
ments enhance accountability (Peters and Pierre 2004), recent studies show, in
contrast, that it undermines the performance of the state apparatus (Dahlström
and Holmgren 2017). Political appointments may disrupt accountability channels,
as political appointees have stronger incentives to misreport policy performance
data crucial for the public to evaluate government performance than meritocrati-
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cally employed civil servants (Boräng et al. 2018). Additionally, stronger political
control of public administrations seems to correlate with high corruption, clien-
telism, and poor provision of public goods (Bersch, Praça, and Taylor 2017; Cornell
and Grimes 2015; Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell 2012; Geddes 1994; Keefer
2007; Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016; Shefter 1994; Stokes 2013).
In a politicized public administration within a democracy, the careers of admin-
istrative personnel highly depend on which party wins the election. Job insecurity
increases motivation for civil servants to maximize private benefits while in office
and engage in corrupt practices if the opportunity appears. Insecurity also incen-
tivizes short time horizons. This in its turn, paradoxically, reduces the ability of
politicians to influence the actions of civil servants and therefore can diminish the
ability of politicians to achieve policy goals (Huber and McCarty 2004).
By contrast, if meritocratic recruitment is the norm, few civil servants will lose
their jobs after new elections. This makes it more likely that they will develop
longer time horizons in their commitment to public policy implementation. Mer-
itocratic rules of employment constrain politicians in democracies from pursuing
targeted policies, as they become unable to influence the administrative agenda
in the state apparatus. Thus meritocratic public administrations, to a certain
degree, “tie the hands” of incumbents and create a limit to the actions of demo-
cratic rulers (Cornell 2014). Without such constraint, politicians can have strong
motivation and opportunity to focus on the provision of targeted goods to bene-
fit a few citizens rather than public goods that benefit the majority (Keefer and
Vlaicu 2008). In this regard, although politicization of public office is a common
practice in many established democracies, a higher degree of politicization is as-
sociated with lower administrative capacity and is likely to diminish the benefits
that democratic institutions might bring to the citizens.
Separation of careers additionally creates a system of checks and balances
through which civil servants can exert oversight on politicians and “counter-
balance” their incentives for a short-sighted behavior. This stimulates long
time horizons within the political system and makes it more conducive to such
long-term commitments as environmental sustainability.
Another mechanism through which public administration impacts the function-
ing of democratic regimes is by affecting the quality of adopted policies. Civil
servants do not only carry out laws decided upon by politicians; agency leaders
are also responsible for designing step-by-step action plans for policy implemen-
tation. Low administrative competence negatively influences the quality of these
action plans, even if the overarching law decided upon in the parliament is promis-
ing. The level of competence in the public administration can therefore determine
whether public policies succeed or fail (Gormley and Balla 2013).
40
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Administrative or bureaucratic capacity also affects political decisions on the
allocation of resources for the implementation of welfare programs. There are few
incentives for politicians to spend money on projects that require high bureau-
cratic capacity if they are aware that public administration is corrupt or incompe-
tent (Dahlström, Lindvall, and Rothstein 2013). Due to their complexity, policies
directed towards environmental sustainability require the high discretion of the
public administration, and in countries with low bureaucratic capacity politicians
are unlikely to allocate funding for such complex long-term projects if they know
that the public administration is incapable of formulating effective action plans or
rigorously enforcing them. It is more attractive for politicians to direct resources
away from long-term environmental projects to similar short-term policies that
bring more visible results. Some examples of such short-term policies are building
parks instead of reforesting a country’s national forest reserves or building water
pipes to broaden access to drinking water instead of cleaning water sources.
The quality of public administration is, however, only a part of the story. Cor-
ruption and weak rule of law can also intervene in how democratic institutions
work for environmental sustainability. Corruption provides unique opportunities
for the personal enrichment of civil servants and politicians. It can disrupt the
benefits that democratic institutions can bring to citizens through undermining
the coercive capacity of the state, disincentivizing compliance and greasing the
wheels for the penetration of special interests into politics, as described in the
previous section.
With corrupt “rules of the game” politicians are more likely to steal resources
from public policy budgets. This problem is especially acute with public policies
that require long-term implementation and bring results with low visibility, such
as environmental sustainability programs. The slow response of the environment
to human action (see Section 3.1.1) obstructs monitoring of government actions
aimed at implementation of environmental sustainability programs, making mis-
appropriation of public funds less visible in this domain. Low awareness about
environmental problems and their generally diluted sources can further obstruct
the channels of democratic accountability, as citizens might not be aware of how
to judge government actions. If people do not know which governmental actions
are beneficial for the environment, their judgment can rely on incorrect signals
and lead to satisfaction with insubstantial outcomes. This also makes it easier for
politicians to deviate from environmental commitments. The challenges created
by the slow response of the environment to policy interventions, their low visibility
and also diluted responsibility are therefore especially critical in democracies with
low quality of government.
Weak rule of law lays the ground for corrupt behavior and embezzlement, which
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divert resources away from environmental sustainability goals. A corrupt judicial
system can also be a threat to implementation of such long-term projects as envi-
ronmental sustainability. Interest groups with influence over politics and greater
financial resources, which are often not environmental interests, may be able to
“buy” victory in controversial cases regarding environmental sustainability.
This detrimental effect of low governmental quality on environmental sustain-
ability outcomes, I expect, can be especially strong in democracies compared to
authoritarian regimes, while high quality of government can be especially beneficial
for environmental sustainability in democracies. The literature argues that demo-
cratic institutions are beneficial for environmental sustainability due to pluralism,
freedom of information and openness to “green” interests. High governmental
quality allows democracies to commit to these “green” agendas by facilitating
long-term implementation.
Even in democracies, where environmental concerns have the opportunity to
enter decision-making and environmental movements can make their voices heard,
governments are more likely to have better policies and deliver the results under
the condition of high governmental quality. High quality of government facilitates
longer time horizons of the regime, opens doors to knowledgeable public officials
that have expertise more appropriate to the context of environmental issues than
politically appointed employees could have, and creates positive reinforcement for
policy-making through a positive anticipatory effect.
The literature argues that democratic institutions can be detrimental for envi-
ronmental sustainability due to the openness of democratic regimes to interests
that go against environmental protection and due to short time horizons defined
by the span of the electoral cycle. Weak rule of law, incompetent and unstable
bureaucracy, as well as corruption stimulate democracy’s negative impact on en-
vironmental sustainability. Low quality of government triggers incentives for the
short-sighted behavior that electoral cycles already provoke and the democratic
rules of the game become more about vote-buying and satisfying the interests of
the influential few rather than the majority.
By contrast, stable bureaucracy, strong rule of law and absence of corruption
help harness the positive effects that democratic institutions have on environmental
sustainability, including broader representation, freedom of information, broader
redistribution, and provision of public goods to broader masses. Strong bureau-
cracy and rule of law tie politicians’ hands in following up on their incentives to
satisfy their short-term interests.
In authoritarian regimes, where policy-making solely depends on the will of the
ruler, quality of government does not have the same strong moderating effect as in
democracies, which can prevent the short-sighted opportunistic behavior of those
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Figure 6: Two alternative patterns of the relationship between democ-
racy and QoG in their effect on environmental sustainability
in power. Instead, its main effect is on the implementation of policies and the
capacity of the regime to fulfil official tasks. Bureaucratic capacity also weighs on
autocrats’ decisions to commit or not to commit to complex long-term tasks, as
it gives autocrats an indication as to whether the public administration is capable
of implementing them or not.
If both the input- and output-sides of a political system are shaped by political
institutions favorable to environmental sustainability, then the political system is
more likely to reach environmental sustainability targets than if only one of the
sides of the political system is functioning under favorable political institutions.
The effects of democracy and the components of quality of government can be
seen as complementary to each other in the production of environmental sustain-
ability outcomes. While democracy is conducive to the provision of public goods
(e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 2003; Lake and Baum 2001), successful delivery of such
goods is unlikely if the capacity to implement public policies is low. By contrast,
when quality of government is high, the positive effect of democracy on the uni-
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versal provision of public goods intensifies, as the government is actually capable
of delivering the goods (Hanson 2015). The same money spent on the provision of
public goods and services in countries with high and low quality of government,
produces more public goods delivery in high-capacity states, due to more effective
implementation (Knutsen 2013, 3).
We can therefore expect that democracies with high governmental quality have
better environmental performance than democracies with low quality of govern-
ment. While this expectation is rather straightforward,4 it is less intuitive as to
how democracies with low and high quality of government stand against authoritar-
ian regimes with different levels of governmental quality in securing environmental
sustainability.
In authoritarian regimes with low quality of government, where the capacity to
implement policies is low, dictators are more likely to engage in predatory behavior
or focus more on their political survival without committing to long-term programs
of universal welfare provision (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Bueno de Mesquita
2003; Robinson 1998). High state capacity, Knutsen (2013) hypothesizes, however,
can compensate for the lack of democracy and provide dictators with the tools to
deliver public goods. In contrast to democracies with low governmental quality,
which are incapable of public goods provision, some dictators in high quality of
government contexts are still able to provide universal social welfare. We can
therefore expect that authoritarian regimes with high governmental quality can,
on average, outperform democracies with low quality of government (Figure 6).5
It is, however, an open question as to whether democracies with low quality of
government outperform authoritarian states with low quality of government. Fig-
ure 6 illustrates two alternative patterns. Panel a) on Figure 6 depicts a pattern,
in which the performance of democracies with low quality of government is no dif-
ferent from that of authoritarian regimes with low quality of government. Knutsen
(2013) argues that “more democracy” can compensate for the lack of state capac-
ity in reaching short-term goals visible to the electorate, such as economic growth.
This implies that democracies tend to better deliver short-term visible outcomes
than non-democratic regimes, even if their state capacity is low. It is, however,
unlikely, that more democracy can commit to long-term environmental sustain-
ability projects in low quality of government settings. Therefore, in the provision
of environmental outcomes, the differences between democracies with low quality
of government and authoritarian regimes with low quality of government might
not be substantial.
4 Despite being straightforward, these conditional effects have not been tested in previous re-
search.
5 Lack of observations on authoritarian states with high quality of government makes it prob-
lematic to put this expectation to an empirical test
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Figure 7: The relationship between democracy, quality of government
and environmetnal sustainability
Panel b) on Figure 6 presents a pattern, in which democratic regimes with low
QoG perform worse than authoritarian regimes with low QoG in securing envi-
ronmental sustainability outcomes. This pattern can appear if low governmental
quality is more detrimental for environmental sustainability outcomes in democra-
cies than in authoritarian regimes. One of the mechanisms behind this relationship
may be that poor governmental quality can create strong incentives for democratic
rulers to steal resources or spend the resources on short-term projects, targeting
specific groups of the electorate through clientelistic exchanges, rather than secur-
ing universal delivery of public goods and services (Hanson 2015; Knutsen 2013).
In low quality of government settings, environmental (long-term) commitments
are for this reason highly unlikely. At the same time, some authoritarian regimes
with low governmental quality, if they are stable, can still (hypothetically) secure
the provision of environmental public goods and services if the results are more or
less visible to the ruler’s main support group.
To sum up, the majority of previous studies have focused on testing the following
two hypotheses:
H1 More democracy is associated with better environmental sustainability outcomes
H2 Higher quality of government is associated with better environmental sustain-
ability outcomes
This dissertation moves the previous efforts forward by claiming that the two ef-
fects cannot be considered separately when investigating political determinants of
public policy outcomes. Both democracy and quality of government are two indis-
pensable parts of the political system and affect (moderate) each other’s impact
on public policy outcomes. In this dissertation, I suggest that they should rather
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be considered in interaction (Figure 7)6 and suggest the following hypothesis:
H3 The effect of democracy on environmental sustainability outcomes is condi-
tioned by the quality of government.
Another plausible hypothesis is that the effect of quality of government on environ-
mental sustainability outcomes is dependent on the levels of democracy (see lower
panel of Figure 6), which could be depicted by an arrow from the “Democracy”
box to the arrow connecting the “Quality of Government” and “Environmental
Sustainability” boxes on Figure 7. While in some parts of the empirical analysis
I test this hypothesis alongside H3 to investigate nuances of the interaction effect,
investigation of the moderating effect of democracy is not the main focus of this
dissertation. Instead, the moderating effect of the quality of government is. Also,
I do not hypothesize how different combinations of political institutions relate to
environmental sustainability, as it is uncertain if we can generalize the hypothe-
sized relationship patterns across different environmental sustainability outcomes.
Instead, I leave the patterns of the interaction to reveal themselves during the em-
pirical analysis, and instead present, in Figure 6, different expectations regarding
the interdependent effects of democracy and quality of government on environ-
mental sustainability outcomes.
6 There is a vast literature arguing that democracy and quality of government are also related
and can affect one another. Some claim that democratic institutions eventually bring state
capacity (e.g., Montinola and Jackman 2002; Shefter 1994), others that it is state capacity
that helps democratic institutions to develop (D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017; Fortin 2012; Linz
and Stepan 1996; Møller and Skaaning 2011). In this dissertation, I do not delve into this
debate and do not model mediation, as the causality between the two is not firmly established.
Instead, while acknowledging that these two sets of institutions affect one another, I model
their interaction, emphasizing that they are still distinct sets of political system characteristics.
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Research design
The dissertation consists of five articles, each testing the hypotheses of the study
on different Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations 2015) related
to environmental sustainability.
Article 1, The Limits of Democracy in Tackling Climate Change, is
solo-authored and published in Environmental Politics (2018). The article investi-
gates the role of democracy and corruption in driving the levels of CO2 emissions
that contribute to climate change. Countries’ efforts to reduce CO2 emissions are
a part of strategies to mitigate climate change, which is Sustainable Development
Goal #13.
Article 2, Do Political Institutions Moderate GDP-CO2 relationship?,
is co-authored with Ole Martin Lægreid and published in Ecological Economics
(2018). The article delves into the results of article 1 in greater detail and tests
if the political institutions that have been found to matter in predicting CO2
emissions also moderate the relationship between the level of economic develop-
ment, operationalized with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and CO2
emissions. Separating economic growth from the increase in CO2 emissions is an
essential step towards climate change mitigation. Our moderation analysis helps
determine if rich well-governed countries (democracies with low corruption) have
indeed managed to decouple increases in their GDP per capita from CO2 emis-
sions, as theories suggest. While article 1 investigates the direct effect of political
institutions on CO2 emissions, article 2 investigates their indirect effect that goes
through economic development.
Article 3, “Gimme Shelter”: the Role of Democracy and Institutional
Quality in Disaster Preparedness, is co-authored with Tove Ahlbom Persson
and published in Political Research Quarterly (2018). The article looks at whether
democracy and quality of government can predict how countries prepare for natural
disasters. Preparation for natural disasters is a part of a country’s strategy to
adapt to climate change, which also falls under SDG #13.
Article 4, In Light of Democracy and Corruption: Institutional De-
terminants of Electricity Provision, is co-authored with Frida Boräng and
Sverker Jagers and is QoG Working paper 2016:14. The article engages in the
academic debate on the role of democratic institutions in determining the extent
of electrification and revisits the renowned findings by Min (2015) that longer
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democratic experience is associated with higher electrification rates. The article
replicates Min’s empirical tests and investigates whether corruption in public ad-
ministration disrupts the positive effect of democracy on electricity provision, as
revealed by Min (2015). Access to reliable energy helps reduce the use of firewood
and coal, as well as deforestation and the land degradation connected to it. It is
listed among the tasks within SDG #7.
Article 5, Fresh Pipes with Dirty Water: How Quality of Government
Shapes the Provision of Public Goods in Democracies, is co-authored with
Ketevan Bolkvadze and is under “Revise and Resubmit” in the European Journal of
Political Research.The article examines how democracy and quality of government
contribute to the provision of clean water and delves into the mechanisms behind
their interdependent relationship by investigating a typical case of democracy with
low governmental quality. Access to clean water is one of the targets in SDG #6.
Table 4 summarizes the articles and the main findings.
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4.1 Data
4.1.1 Dependent variables
In Article 1, The Limits of Democracy in Tackling Climate Change, I investigate
the interdependent effects of democracy and corruption on CO2 emissions. CO2
emissions are largely a by-product of energy use. They result from the combustion
of fossil fuels to generate electricity and heating, burning of gasoline and diesel
in transportation, chemical reactions in the production of metals, cement and
chemicals, and other industry activities (IPCC 2014). While the world ecosystems
are designed to absorb some amount of CO2, excessive amounts of CO2 emission
can result in concentrations that exceed the absorption capacity of ecosystems and
contribute to climate change (IPCC 2014). Reducing CO2 emissions to the levels
within the absorption capacity of ecosystems is a part of the efforts to mitigate
climate change. It is listed as Sustainable Development Goal #13.
Climate change as an environmental problem has characteristics that make
it complex to solve. It is a product of interconnected processes between
various ecosystems; it develops slowly as a response to anthropogenic and
non-anthropogenic drivers; the benefits of climate change prevention are highly
diffuse; there are a large number of actors on many different levels involved in
contributing to climate change; and the issue requires the involvement of experts
in decision-making.
Analyzing data on emission levels has certain advantages over analyzing data
on the chemical concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. Concentration data are
only relevant for the city level and are difficult to reliably estimate, since emissions
travel and the precision of measurement depends on the quality of the measuring
device. Emissions, on the other hand, directly reflect actions that emitters take,
since the measure directly shows how much carbon dioxide emitting actors release.
In measuring CO2 emissions, I use the indicator from the Emissions Database for
Global Atmospheric Research expressed in tons of CO2 emissions per capita per
country and per year (Oliver et al. 2015).
In Article 2, Do Political Institutions Moderate GDP-CO2 relationship?, the
main dependent variable is the effect of GDP per capita on CO2 emissions or per
capita GDP elasticities of CO2 emissions. Many rich countries today have reached
their current levels of economic development by overexploiting natural resources
or/and by means of intense industrialization, which exert high pressure on the envi-
ronment. Today, as environmental crisis is gradually approaching, countries at low
levels of economic development can hardly rely on reaching high income levels by
the same means as developed nations without severe environmental consequences
for the rest of the globe. As there is still a need for economic development, one of
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the biggest questions today is how to reach sustainable economic growth without
additional pressure on the environment. Decoupling economic growth from the
increase in CO2 emissions, which is largely driven by industrial activities and un-
sustainable energy use, is one of the crucial steps towards sustainable development.
In the article, we treat such separation of economic growth, operationalized with
GDP per capita, from CO2 emissions as one of the challenges that countries face
on the path to sustainable development. This challenge falls under SDG #13.
In Article 3, “Gimme Shelter”: the Role of Democracy and Institutional Quality
in Disaster Preparedness, Tove Ahlbom Persson and I explore the interdependent
effects of democracy and quality of government on countries’ ability to prepare for
hazardous weather events and thus minimize the number of victims from natural
disasters. Ensuring public safety and security from natural disasters involves the
provision of public goods, including the mapping of hazard areas, construction of
preventive measures, such as dykes or levies, establishment and maintenance of
early warning systems, and securing reliable public infrastructure, such as evacu-
ation roads, health centers, and shelters (Raschky 2008; Schulz 2015).
In societies unprepared for natural disasters, constant adverse weather events
hamper growth and impact human health and development. Prepared countries,
on the contrary, do not have to spend considerable proportions of their budget
to deal with the consequences of disasters. They have the underlying security to
invest in growth and human development. Therefore, preparing for future disasters
is a necessary pillar of sustainable development and it is listed as a target under
sustainable development goal #13. Ability to prepare for natural disasters is an
asset in the adaptation to climate change, as the number of natural disaster is
likely to grow due to temperature changes and ecological imbalances (Parry et al.
2007).
Preparedness for natural disasters is a complex issue. There is uncertainty re-
garding when the next disaster will occur and therefore undertaking preparatory
steps requires long time horizons from decision-makers, as politicians will only reap
the benefits from their actions when the next natural hazard occurs. Natural haz-
ards are external shocks and therefore the responsibility for the number of victims
is not necessarily perceived as a political failure. However, the benefits of disaster
prevention for the people are not as diffused as those from CO2 emission reduc-
tions. People directly experience the negative consequences of natural hazards if
the country is unprepared. Therefore, disaster preparedness has high visibility in
areas frequently hit by natural disasters. Quick mobilization and mitigation of
the consequences of disaster are possible even in short-sighted political regimes.
However, preparation for future disasters that minimizes the number of disaster
victims requires long time horizons from decision-makers as it involves the provi-
51
4. RESEARCH DESIGN
sion of public goods that would foster support for government actions only when
the next natural hazard strikes.
In the article, we operationalize preparedness for natural disasters with the
total number of people affected per year, a measure taken from the International
Disaster Database, gathered by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters (Guha-Sapir, Below, and Hoyois 2016). We weight it by the number of
disasters happening in countries per year, population size, or land area to make
the measure more comparable across countries.
In Article 4, In Light of Democracy and Corruption: Institutional Determinants
of Electricity Provision, Frida Boräng, Sverker Jagers, and I investigate the inter-
dependent effects of democracy and corruption in public administration on the
government provision of energy. Energy is needed for heating, lighting, cooking,
industrial purposes, etc. and it can be produced through, for example, the burning
of firewood, coal or by generating electricity in power plants. Electricity material-
izes the need for energy and provides opportunities to reduce the use of firewood
and coal, consequently reducing deforestation and the land degradation connected
to it.
The provision of “reliable, affordable and modern energy services” is a target
under the UN’s sustainable development goal #7 (United Nations 2015). While
electricity generated through non-renewable sources helps to achieve this goal to
a lesser degree than electricity generated through renewable energy sources, such
as hydro-, solar- and wind-power plants, it still contributes to the reduction of
wood and coal-burning practices, which makes provision of electricity necessary
for sustainable development.
Provision of electricity is a less complex undertaking for decision-makers than
protection of the population from natural disasters or mitigation of climate change
through CO2 emissions reductions. It relies on a fewer number of actors, mostly
electricity providers, either public or private, and mostly involves problems typical
to public goods delivery. Electrification projects are visible but may take time
before the results can be directly observed.
In the article, we operationalize energy provision with a measure of the pro-
portion of population living in unlit areas. We use the satellite data capturing
night-time lights from the Defence Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational
Linescan System (DMSP-OLS). In the article, we do not distinguish between the
sources of electricity, which generate lights visible on the satellite images.
Article 5, Fresh Pipes with Dirty Water: How Quality of Government Shapes
the Provision of Public Goods in Democracies, is an empirical account of the inter-
dependent effects of democracy and quality of government on water quality. Safe
drinking water is a basic human need and is crucial for human health. Goal #6
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in the SDG framework sets access to safe and affordable drinking water as one of
the essential targets.
The problems of water quality are complex. Water ecosystems depend on the
condition of the forests and land surrounding the water bodies and therefore are
inherently connected to forest and land management. It requires strong expert
knowledge and awareness of the ecosystem interdependance. Water management
therefore requires consultation with scientists. While providing access to water
through building pipes and boreholes can be achieved in a short time frame, reach-
ing and maintaining good drinking water quality is a long-term undertaking. It
is connected to reducing water emissions, building and maintaining water treat-
ment plants, as well as maintaining the self-cleaning properties of the water by
sustaining the health of aquatic ecosystems and biodiversity.
As access to clean drinking water is one of people’s basic needs and is essential
for human wellbeing, the issue of water quality has, seemingly, high visibility.
However, it takes a relatively long time before the results from actions to purify
water sources become visible to the general public. Additionally, water quality,
to a certain degree, depends on factors outside government control, such as the
polluting and extractive behavior of the neighboring countries sharing a particular
water body. Diffused sources of pollution make it difficult to isolate the effect of
government competence on the actual outcome by concealing government efforts
in delivering access to clean drinking water.
In the article, we measure water quality in two ways. First, we capture the level
of water pollution by using the measure of biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)
in internal water bodies. The indicator measuring BOD is taken from the World
Bank (World Bank 2015). Second, we measure the efforts to reduce organic water
pollution by the number of wastewater treatment plants operating in countries
relative to population connected to wastewater treatment plants. The measure is
taken from the Environmental Performance Index and varies from 0 to 100 with
higher values denoting higher levels of wastewater treatment (Hsu et al. 2014)
All five articles, therefore, inspect the interdependent influence of democracy
and QoG on various UN sustainable development goals related to environmental
sustainability at different complexity levels. Reduction of CO2 emissions, which
is the focus of the first two papers, is related to climate change mitigation, and
is crucial for achieving sustainable development goal #13 (United Nations 2015).
Achieving reductions in CO2 emissions is the most complex task for national gov-
ernments out of all the sustainable development goals considered in this disserta-
tion. It requires institutions that simultaneously make governments cooperate in
global collective action, act as successful third-party enforcers in regulating col-
lective action between domestic emitters, think long-term in addressing problems
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with consequences for future generations rather than current voters, involve ex-
perts in the decision-making to determine reasonable CO2 emission targets, and
that facilitate policy implementation, ensuring repeated monitoring and inspec-
tions.
Preparedness for natural disasters involves provision of public goods and is more
directly visible to people than reduction of CO2 emissions. It is connected to cli-
mate change adaptation and is an official target under sustainable development
goal #13. Preparation for natural disasters is a less complex project for implemen-
tation than reduction of CO2 emissions, however it also poses a complex dilemma
for decision-makers. It requires political institutions that secure the provision
of the necessary public goods, such as disaster-resilient infrastructure, promote
long time horizons to deal with uncertainty regarding the occurrence of external
shocks, and that enable consultation with experts for disaster-resilient planning.
In contrast to CO2 emissions, disaster preparations require institutions that en-
sure universality of public goods provision to minimize the impact of disasters on
marginalized groups. It is not, however, directly connected to governments’ role
in facilitating collective action or providing monitoring and inspections.
Provision of energy poses less complex dilemmas for decision-makers than pro-
vision of other public goods covered in the articles, namely, stabilizing the climate,
preparing for natural disasters and ensuring high water quality. It can essentially
be provided without dealing with external shocks, managing numerous sources
of the problem, or involving expert opinions in decision-making. However, elec-
trification also requires political institutions necessary for universal public goods
delivery and long time horizons, as electrification projects take time and need
maintenance. It also requires involving experts (engineers) in the implementation
of electrification projects as installing and ensuring the functioning of electricity
grids is a technically complex task. Provision of electricity is listed in the UN
sustainable development goals as goal #7.
Ensuring access to clean drinking water is a highly complex problem connected
to finding a balance between the provision of public goods with quick returns,
such as building pipelines, and public goods with slow returns, such as purifying
water bodies. Reaching water quality that is safe for drinking is a target under
sustainable development goal #6. It requires political institutions that trigger
the same mechanisms as those needed to facilitate collective action among local
emitters for reducing CO2 emissions, make states cooperate in collective action in
managing shared water bodies, ensure effective inspections and enforcement, and
that involve experts in decision-making over water management. It also requires
political institutions favorable to disaster preparation, such as those ensuring uni-
versal public goods delivery and long time horizons for maintaining water quality
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longer than the current electoral cycle. Compared to CO2 emissions or natural
disaster preparedness, however, clean water has higher visibility for the electorate,
as it is a basic need and affects people’s everyday lives.
CO2 emissions, readiness to cope with natural disasters, electricity provision,
and water quality vary in their degree of complexity and therefore present a use-
ful set of problems for comparison. Possessing different problem characteristics,
the different sustainable development goals analyzed in this dissertation provide
an opportunity to compare whether the political institutions under investigation,
namely, democracy and quality of government, are designed to tackle problems at
different levels of complexity.
The measures used in the analysis relate to the provision of public goods pertain-
ing to the environment or protection of the environment and they do not capture
environmental sustainability directly. Sustainability, which relates to the continu-
ity of the “favorable” environmental outcomes, is difficult to capture at present, as
efforts to protect the environment are rather recent. Ecosystems respond slowly to
human action and it is still impossible to draw conclusions on whether the achieved
“favorable” outcomes are sustainable or not. Such conclusions will require contin-
uous measurement and expert evaluation over a long period of time. However, the
first actions towards protecting the environment today, as well as the provision of
environmental public goods that contribute to reaching sustainable development
goals – outcomes that this paper does address – can serve as an indication of
countries’ first steps towards environmental sustainability.
Policy outcome vs policy output
All five articles analyze the connections between political institutions and the
observable state of the environment. In the existing literature that analyzes such
connections, the observable state of the environment is often referred to as “en-
vironmental performance” or “environmental outcomes”. Such terminology nec-
essarily implies certain actions towards environmental protection or provision of
environmental public goods. This in turn implies the presence of environmental
policies, laws and regulations, as they are tools for reaching environmental goals.
Theories outlined in the theoretical chapter of this dissertation suggest that poli-
cies mediate the relationship between democracy and environmental outcomes. In
this dissertation, however, due to the lack of comprehensive cross-country data on
the presence of such policies, I do not model the mediating effect of public policies,
and rather directly investigate the relationship between political institutions and
the state of the environment. Such implicit mediation by public policies, however,
does not pose a severe threat to the results, as it only adds noise to the data and
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increases the likelihood of false negatives rather than false positives.
Additionally, the presence of environmental policies is only a weak proxy for
countries’ commitment to protect the environment. The presence of policies does
not imply that they will automatically be implemented; what matters are the
actual actions towards environmental protection (e.g., reduction of emissions) or
provision of environmental public goods (e.g., disaster prevention measures).
Comparing the state of the environment between different political regimes,
without modelling policy mediation, can still provide valuable insights into which
political conditions, through one mechanism or the other, are favorable for main-
taining a healthy environment or delivering environmental public goods, even if
we cannot be certain that states achieve particular environmental outcomes due
to the adoption of environmental policies. We can, however, infer such from the
theories after accounting for potential confounders.
4.1.2 Independent variables
Both democracy and quality of government are theory-laden concepts and their
measures rely on theories used by data collecting organizations when designing
expert surveys. My choice of indicators for the operationalization of these con-
cepts is based, first of all, on the theories underpinning the relationship between
democracy, quality of government and environmental outcomes, and, secondly, on
methodological considerations.
In articles 1, 3, and 5 the level of democracy is operationalized with the electoral
democracy index from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge,
Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish M., et al. 2016).
Data provided by the Varieties of Democracy project have an advantage over
other existing measures of democracy due to the transparent aggregation and
data collection processes. The data coding involved 2,500 country experts, who
provided estimates of regime characteristics for each country-year (Pemstein et al.
2017). The electoral democracy index is based on the “thin” (minimal) under-
standing of electoral democracy, conceptualized by Dahl (1989) as Polyarchy. It
measures freedom of association and expression, the extent to which elections in
countries are free and fair, whether suffrage is universal, and whether the exec-
utive is elected, either through popular elections or through a popularly elected
legislature (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard,
Fish, et al. 2016). The advantage of a thin definition of democracy is that it
does not combine electoral institutions, political rights, and civil liberties with the
rule of law, unlike definitions of democracy used by other organizations measuring
democracy, such as Freedom House and Polity IV, whose indicators are common
in the empirical literature. Rule of law is an institution that shapes exercise of
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political power rather than access to political power (see, e.g., Rothstein 2011)
and using a “thin” definition of democracy allows for testing the hypothesized in-
teraction effect between democracy and governmental quality without conflating
the two through the overlapping measurements.7 The index varies from 0 to 1,
with higher values corresponding to higher levels of democracy.
In articles 2 and 4, my co-authors and I use experience with democracy instead
of democracy level at a given year as an independent variable, and the reasons for
this are different in each of the articles. In article 2, the choice is guided by the
methodological considerations specific to the moderation analysis we perform. In-
vestigating the moderating effect of multiple political variables requires modelling
interactions between them and GDP per capita. We opted for dichotomizing all in-
dicators gauging political institutions and constructing binary indices, as it makes
interpretation of the interaction effects easier and more intuitive. In addition,
we perform cross-country regression, but aim to incorporate information from the
time series into the analysis. Therefore, we opted for computing a measure of
a cumulative experience with democracy by counting the number of years when
a country scored 1 on a democracy indicator. In article 4, we use experience of
democracy to first replicate and then revisit the findings by Min (2015), who also
uses experience of democracy as his main independent variable. In this way the
article makes an empirical contribution to the current academic debate.
In both articles we use a dichotomous measure of democracy developed by
Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) in the main analysis. In article 2 we also fill
in missing values using the Varieties of Democracy dataset (for the methodology of
imputation, please see the Methods section of the article). Cheibub et al’s (2010)
measure is coded as 1 if the chief executive and legislature are popularly elected,
if more than one party is competing in the elections, and if “an alternation in
power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to
office [. . . ] have taken pace.” Taking the originally dichotomous measure creates a
more intuitive (and more internationally recognized) distinction between political
regimes than we could obtain using our own dichotomizing strategies.
In the operationalization of governmental quality, the articles follow different
strategies. In articles 3 and 5, my co-authors and I use an indicator of Quality of
Government from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) developed by the
Political Risk Services (PRS) group that aggregates different aspects of govern-
mental quality into a single score per country and per year. More specifically, it
7 For robustness checks in articles 1, 3, 4, and 5, however, I do use the indicator of democracy
developed by Hadenius and Teorell (2005) and updated by Teorell et al. (2016) in the Quality
of Government dataset every year. The index is an average between Freedom House and
Polity IV measures of democracy and has been shown to perform better in terms of validity
and reliability than its separate parts.
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Figure 8: Countries plotted according to democracy and QoG dimen-
sions
accounts for the extent of corruption, bureaucratic quality, and the degree of law
and order in countries around the globe (ICRG 2014). The corruption indicator
measures the prevalence of corruption within polities in different forms, includ-
ing patronage, nepotism, job reservations, tit-for-tat exchanges, unofficial party
funding and close connections between politics and business. The indicator on law
and order measures the strength and capabilities of the legal system, as well as
public obedience with the law. The measure of bureaucratic quality is a proxy for
the capacity of a public administration to perform its tasks independently from
political influence, and also taps into the issues of meritocratic employment of civil
servants.
Taken together, the components reflect aspects of governmental quality relevant
for countries’ environmental performance, as described in the theoretical chapter.
It is rather difficult to disentangle the separate effects of these different but highly
interconnected factors pertaining to quality of government, as they all affect each
other and often go “hand-in-hand”. However, they are all still highly relevant
for the provision of disaster preparedness and water quality and can disrupt the
positive effects of democracy. Therefore, the aggregated composite measure of
governmental quality, which captures the underlying phenomena of quality of gov-
ernment rather than its distinct aspects, is more useful for estimation than its
parts taken separately. The index varies from 0 to 1, where higher values reflect
higher quality of government.
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In articles 1 and 2, I use a narrower indicator of governmental quality and in-
vestigate if the effect of democracy on CO2 emissions is particularly conditional
on the level of corruption. I choose a narrower indicator for a number of reasons.
First, it captures theories of how governmental quality can influence CO2 emissions
in particular more precisely. The corruption indicator more directly captures the
influence of business interests in policy-making, which is relevant for CO2 emission
policies. Second, it more directly captures problems with monitoring and inspect-
ing emitters’ behavior than broader measures of QoG and reflects incentives for
polluters to comply with the rules. Third, corruption is an established determi-
nant of CO2 emissions in environmental economics research (see, e.g., Cole 2007;
Damania, Fredriksson, and List 2003; Fredriksson and Svensson 2003; Pellegrini
2011; Welsch 2004) and using the corruption indicator allows me to communicate
with the previous research more directly. I operationalize the level of corruption
with the Varieties of Democracy project’s composite indicator of political corrup-
tion, which measures executive, legislative, judicial and public sector corruption
and therefore also taps into many of the aspects of the quality of government index
used in articles 3 and 4. The index varies between 0 and 1, where higher values
correspond to higher corruption.
In article 4, my co-authors and I explore democracy’s effects on the provision of
energy, in the form of electricity, conditional on the extent of corruption in public
administration. By using a narrow indicator of governmental quality, we aim to
capture only the necessary conditions that we think are especially important for
the achievement of less complex sustainable development goals, such as provision
of reliable electricity. Electrification is connected to the provision of public goods
rather than protection of the commons, it is not affected by exogenous factors out-
side of electricity providers’ control (apart from exogenous shocks), and it requires
the involvement of experts in the implementation of electrification programs but
not necessarily policy-making. Corrupt public administration, incapable of devel-
oping action plans and implementing official goals, is one of the major obstacles
interfering with the successful implementation of electrification projects and using
a more specific indicator provides an opportunity to investigate a more specific
mechanism of how quality of government moderates the effect of democracy. We
use V-Dem’s indicator of corruption in public administration, which measures to
what extent public officials provide favors for bribes, and to what extent they
“steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for per-
sonal or family use” (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman,
Bernhard, Fish, et al. 2016).
Figure 8 plots countries on the dimensions of democracy and quality of govern-
ment for the year 2010. Democracy is measured with the electoral democracy index
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from the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge et al. 2017), while quality of
government is measured with the quality of government index from the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide (from Teorell et al. 2017). Table in the Appendix to
the introductory chapter of this dissertation specifies how different countries score
on democracy and quality of government dimensions in the year 2010.
4.1.3 Control variables
The challenge with using environmental outcomes (state of the environment) rather
than environmental outputs (policies) as dependent variables is that environmental
outcomes can depend on a multitude of factors, including a country’s history,
economy, geography, and demographics, as well as other external factors. As a
result, it can be challenging to isolate the link between political institutions and
the environment.
In the articles, I make sure to control for the most relevant factors, established
in the previous research as determinants of their respective environmental sustain-
ability outcomes, to separate the effect of these factors from the effect of political
institutions. The set of control variables differs between studies and is individual
to the environmental outcome under investigation. In all papers, I control for
countries’ level of economic development, operationalized with GDP per capita.
Higher economic development is associated with higher environmental pollution
(CO2 emissions and BOD) and at the same time higher likelihood that coun-
tries have enough financial resources to invest in environmental protection (e.g.,
build electricity grids, wastewater treatment plants, and disaster-resilient infras-
tructure).
Papers 1, 3 and 5 also include a control of population density. On the one
hand, densely populated areas are more likely to emit more, have more polluted
water and are more vulnerable to natural hazards. On the other hand, it is easier
to provide public goods related to the environment, such as renewable sources of
energy to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, high water quality, and disaster-resilient
infrastructure, to densely living populations. Papers 1 and 5 include a control
for the size of the urban population to account for higher emissions/pollution
from metropolitan areas and the latitude of countries’ capital cities to account
for geography-specific drivers of CO2 emissions and water pollution. Papers 1
and 2 additionally include controls for the extent of oil production per capita, as
countries with higher oil production tend to emit more due to lack of incentives to
invest in alternative energy sources and demand from the international market. In
paper 1, I also control for countries’ merchandise export per capita to account for
international demand for higher industrial production, Kyoto protocol ratification
to account for countries’ commitment to reduce CO2 emissions, and an island
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dummy, as islands tend to have fewer opportunities for industrial production and
therefore substantially lower CO2 emissions. In Paper 5, I additionally control
for the land area of countries, as it requires more effort to clean water bodies
and build wastewater treatment plants if the territory is large. In Paper 3, I add
measures for countries’ population size, as more people are expected to suffer the
consequences of a disaster in more populated countries. I also add the measures
of the frequency of disasters, to account for demand for disaster protection, and
an equality index, as in more equal societies more people have access to disaster-
resilient infrastructure. Paper 4 takes the set of independent variables from Min
(2015).
Demand
Demand for certain goods (outcomes) constitutes the input-side of the political
system (see Figures 2 and 5). The effect of democracy – which shapes how the
demand for environmental sustainability is articulated – on environmental out-
comes, implies the presence of demand for environmental sustainability, to which
politicians can respond: public demand, demand from organized interests (civil so-
ciety or businesses), or external demand (from the international organizations or
neighbors). In the papers included in this dissertation, I do not model the presence
of demand directly. This is due to the lack of comprehensive and reliable cross-
national time-series data that could capture people’s attitudes and preferences
regarding the environment. It is also problematic to compare citizens’ average
demand for environmental protection across countries, as it is, on average, low
in most political contexts. The key question becomes why demand appears and
advances in some societies but not others. Economic security and confidence in
the capabilities of the state apparatus (determined by the quality of government)
can affect demand (Fairbrother 2016b, 2017), and in this dissertation I specifically
test the role of such underlying factors, without explicitly testing the mechanisms
of their impact.
When the demand for public policy outcomes is not straightforward, I use proxy
measures that can partially account for the presence of demand. When using CO2
emissions as a dependent variable, I control for the level of economic development
operationalized with countries’ GDP per capita. Higher GDP per capita can, to
some extent, account for people’s post-material preferences, which can include
care for the environment (and Fairbrother 2013; Gerhards and Lengfeld 2008;
Inglehart 1995, 1997; with the evidence from Kidd and Lee 1997). When using
number of people affected by natural disasters as a dependent variable, I use the
variable gauging the frequency of natural disasters to capture demand, as it can,
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to some extent, account for whether citizens will support action towards disaster
preparation. We believe that people are more likely to have a personal interest
in disaster preparation if they are frequently exposed to natural disasters. In the
papers using water quality and electricity provision as dependent variables, we do
not model demand, as we assume that clean water and electricity are basic needs of
the population and there are few controversies regarding demand for these public
goods.
Data limitations
As I mainly use secondary data sources in this dissertation, my results fully
depend on the reliability of these data. Although no data are perfectly reliable,
some data are better than others. I ensure that the most recent and widely used
data sources are used, basing my choices on the previous research.
An inherent characteristic of data that gauges political and social factors is
that the scores are based on subjective expert opinions. Although some data col-
lection initiatives, more so than others, deal with cross-country and cross-expert
comparability, it is still difficult to guarantee a unified understanding of questions
and concepts between experts, especially experts from different countries. The
Varieties of Democracy project, from which I take some of my independent vari-
ables, specifically targets this problem in their measurement model (Marquardt
and Pemstein 2017; Pemstein et al. 2017).
Another potential source of bias is that the quality of data is better for some
countries than for others. For example, there are more experts available to judge
political developments in the United States than in, for example, Fiji, and the his-
torical literature available to experts is more diverse and extensive for the United
States than for Fiji. Similarly, data on environmental variables can be more effec-
tively collected in the developed countries compared to the developing world as it
is more likely that developed countries have more modern and precise equipment
and qualified staff for taking measurements. Such bias in data collection could
contribute to the homoscedasticity of errors in the models. While it is difficult
to affect data collection processes, I deal with homoscedasticity in the models by
using different types of robust standard errors.
Despite these limitations, cross-country data provides a unique opportunity to
investigate global patterns of country performance, explain cross-national differ-
ences, and arrive at policy recommendations for national governments, which are
key actors in securing environmental sustainability (see section 3.2). To make sure
that the results of my studies are comparable with other studies in the field, I use
the most widely used data in the research community.
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4.2 Methods
All articles in the dissertation use a deductive approach and test the main the-
oretical model of the study. They present analyses of the interaction between
democracy and governmental quality in their effect on CO2 emissions, number of
people affected by disasters, provision of electricity, and provision of water qual-
ity. Article 2 additionally tests if these political institutions, together with the
number of veto points and players and the extent of civil society participation,
moderate the relationship between gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and
CO2 emissions.
With the aim of exploring the role of political institutions in countries’ environ-
mental performance, my empirical tests rely on time-series cross-sectional data,
using country-years (in articles 1, 2, 3 and 5) or countries (in articles 4 and 5) as
units of analysis. Comparing countries is a valuable tool for drawing conclusions
about the relationships between the variables of interest, as a countries (states)
are the key form of political organization of people, stable over time, which affect
people and their environments.
4.2.1 Within-Between estimator
Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 employ multilevel modelling approaches to account for the
hierarchical structure of the data. The empirical analysis in articles 1, 3, 4 and
5 uses country codes and country divisions as suggested by Teorell et al. (2016,
5–6) in the Quality of Government Dataset. In analyzing the relationship between
democracy, quality of government and different dependent variables related to
environmental sustainability, I am interested both in whether changes in these po-
litical institutions are associated with changes in the environmental sustainability
outcomes at a national level and whether differences in these political institutions
are associated with differences in environmental sustainability outcomes observed
across countries.
The pooled OLS approach suggested by Beck and Katz (1995) has not proven
to be a viable option for the analysis of time-series cross-sectional data due to the
slow-moving nature of both the dependent and independent variables, which results
in high autocorrelation and makes inclusion of the lagged dependent variable to
deal with autocorrelation issues problematic. Cross-country OLS regressions suf-
fer from omitted variable bias, while fixed effects regression eliminates potentially
interesting information on the differences between countries. To accommodate all
of these problems in testing the main hypothesis of the study, in articles 1, 3 and 5
I use the within-between estimator, developed by Bell and Jones (2015) and based
on earlier work by Bartels (2008), Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles (2005),
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and Mundlak (1978). The within-between estimator recognizes the hierarchical
structure of the data; it simultaneously accounts for variation between countries
and developments over time within states. The model allows the use of random
effects by addressing the issue of correlated errors between the two levels of estima-
tion (cross-country and over-time) by mean centering of time-varying variables and
simultaneous inclusion of their country means. Following Bell and Jones’ (2015)
guidelines, I calculate deviations from the country means for each independent
variable and use them instead of the raw values together with the country means
of these independent variables. The model can be summarized in the following
equation:
yit = β0 + β1(xit − xi) + β2xi + β3zi + (ui + eit) (1)
where i is a country, t – year, β0 is the intercept, x is a vector of the independent
time-varying variables, z is a vector of time-invariant variables, u is an error in the
between-equation, and e is an error in the within-equation.
The advantages of the within-between estimator is that it produces different
coefficients for the analysis of variation between units and the analysis of vari-
ation within units and allows comparison of the between- and within-effects of
the independent variables. An alternative approach for the analysis of time-series
cross sectional data is system-GMM estimation as suggested by Arellano and Bond
(1991). However, system-GMM models do not provide an opportunity to compare
differences across countries.
4.2.2 Fractional logit
In article 4, my co-authors and I take as the point of departure the previous work
by Min (2015) and undertake a cross-country analysis. As we aim to perform a
replication study, which we would like to build our contribution upon, we adopt
Min’s methodological approach. We use fractional logistic regression with Huber-
White robust standard errors as suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and
Wooldridge (2002, 661) to estimate the interdependent effects of democracy and
QoG on the proportion of population living in the unlit areas across countries.
This estimation is useful because, different to the OLS regression, it forces the
predicted values to fall inside the 0-1 interval, which is defined by the variance
range of the dependent variable. In fractional logit, the predicted values of the
dependent variable are generated by the following logistic function:
E(y|x) = exp(xβ)1 + exp(xβ) (2)
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4.2.3 Two-stage moderation analysis
In article 2, the aim is to model the moderating effect of various political fac-
tors on the relationship between GDP growth and CO2 emissions. We perform
our analysis in two stages. First, we estimate the relationship between GDP per
capita and CO2 emissions in each of the 156 countries under investigation. We
utilize dynamic common correlated effects methodology to estimate an error cor-
rection model that accounts for non-stationarity, cross-sectional dependency and
parameter heterogeneity.
∆log(CO2pct) = α + β1log(CO2pc)1 + β2∆log(GDPpc)t
+ β3log(GDPpc)t−1 + β4log(Y EAR)t + Z + ε
(3)
where
Z = β5∆log(CO2pc)i,t + β6∆log(CO2pc)i,t−1 + β7∆log(CO2pc)i,t−2
+ β8log(CO2pc)i,t−1 + β9∆log(GDPpc)i,t + β10∆log(GDPpc)i,t−1
+ β11∆log(GDPpc)i,t−2 + β12log(GDPpc)i,t−2
(4)
In this way we obtain β-coefficients for the effect of GDP per capita on CO2
emissions in every country in the sample. An error correction model provides
the opportunity to estimate both long-term effects (based on the coefficients of
lagged-level variables) and short-term effects (based on coefficients of differenced
variables) of GDP per capita. We calculate the long-term effect or the long-run
multiplier (LRM) by dividing the GDP per capita coefficients by the negative value
of the error correction term (for example, β3/ − β1). We then use the obtained
values as the dependent variable in the second stage of our analysis. Therefore,
the dependent variable in the second stage of the analysis is a long-term effect of
GDP per capita on CO2 emissions per country over the years under investigation
(1972-2014). We test if political institutions affect these long-term effects of GDP
per capita on CO2 emissions by performing an ordinary least squares regression:
LRM(log(GDPpc)) = α + β1(GDPpc) + β2(GOV_∗)
+ β3(GDPpc×GOV_∗) + β4(OPRODpc) + ε
(5)
where LRM(log(GDPpc)) is a long-run multiplier or long-term effects of per
capita GDP on CO2 emissions, GOV_* is a term capturing the political traits
under investigation (i.e., democracy, corruption, bicameralism, proportional rep-
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resentation, and/or civil society participation), and OPRODpc is a control variable
in the models – a value of oil production per capita per country and per year.
4.2.4 Qualitative investigation
In article 5, in addition to a Large-N quantitative analysis, my co-author and I
perform a qualitative investigation of mechanisms behind one specific pattern that
stands out from our findings in the quantitative part. In particular, we investigate
how the incentives created by elections and electoral competition may have dele-
terious consequences in a setting with low governmental quality for the provision
of high water quality as an example of a public good related to environmental
sustainability. We choose a typical case of a democracy with low quality of gov-
ernment with a low residual and explore political and bureaucratic impediments
to the government provision of safe drinking water using original triangulated in-
terview data from Moldova that we collected in April 2016. For a more detailed
description of the methodology, see Method section and Appendix A of article 5.
We arrange the quantitative and qualitative parts of the article into a nested
analysis within a mixed-method design framework as suggested by Lieberman
(2005). The qualitative part of the paper allows for an in-depth analysis of the
mechanisms behind the hypothesized relationship between democracy and quality
of government in their effect on water quality as one of the sustainable development
goals, and also provides insights into the potential mechanisms that can drive the
relationship patterns found in other articles.
4.2.5 Limitations of the statistical analysis
There are several limitations of the statistical analysis that have implications for
the conclusions we can make from the studies. First, the slow-moving character
and path dependency of both the independent and dependent variables makes it
problematic to estimate any short-run relationship. Therefore, in most studies I
make sure to estimate long-term effects by conducting analyses based on country-
averages (between-effects). The results of the between-parts of the analyses that
provide an idea of the long-term relationship between the variables are more tan-
gible than the results found in the within-parts of the analyses, which produce
dynamic short-term effects.
Second, in correlational studies, it is difficult to establish causality in the re-
lationship between the phenomena under investigation and therefore inferences
that I make from the analyses are associational or non-causal. Establishing as-
sociations, however, is a key first step in exploring the relationship between the
variables and allows drawing a conclusion on whether it is reasonable to proceed
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with investigating the causality. That said, it is not highly plausible that environ-
mental conditions affect levels of democracy or quality of government in a country.
Therefore, in the case of correlational evidence, with the help of theory, and after
controlling for alternative explanations, it is possible to draw assumptions regard-
ing the direction of the hypothesized relationship and infer causality, even if it is
not possible to secure solid causal links.
Third, and related to the previous point, several independent variables are cor-
related, which implies that democratic development, economic development, and
high quality of government often go together. Their simultaneous inclusion in the
models does not directly create a problem of multicollinearity (according to the
established multicollinearity tests), but it becomes difficult to isolate their effects
on the dependent variable, especially given that current conditions are a result
of long historical developments. Including relevant confounders into the models
helps to partially separate the associations between the variables; however, even
existing theories cannot provide a reliable idea as to which of the factors came first
or which one is the most important predictor. Such uncertainty only emphasizes
that it is more relevant to look at these factors in combination (as this dissertation
does) rather than estimate their separate effects.
Despite some limitations, cross-country analysis can provide important insights
into the relationship between the variables, provided that we acknowledge the
complexity and limitations of modelling such analysis. While it is possible to
track how strong bureaucracy, corruption, rule of law, and democratic institutions
(such as free and fair elections, free media, or freedom of association) influence
environmental outcomes in each particular country, only statistical analysis, which
combines comparable evidence from numerous cases, can establish whether the
observed patterns are systematic.
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Empirical findings
The findings from the five articles vary in their support for Hypotheses 1 and 2,
which postulated independent effects of democracy and quality of government on
sustainable development outcomes related to environmental sustainability. More
specifically, the findings show that both the level of democracy and the level of
corruption matter for the reduction of CO2 emissions. More democracy is also
associated with lower pollution in water sources, while quality of government does
not seem to have a significant association with the level of water pollution when
its effect is considered separately from that of democracy. However, quality of
government seems to be more important than democracy for building wastewa-
ter treatment plants in reaching sustainable development goal #6. At the same
time, neither democracy nor governmental quality seem to have an independent
effect on the number of people affected in disasters. The inconsistent results be-
tween the papers echo the inconsistent findings reported in the previous research.
Hypothesis 3 of the dissertation instead suggests that modelling the independent
effects of democracy and quality of government is likely to create a misspecification
problem. The theoretical model of this dissertation implies that democracy and
governmental quality should rather be considered in interaction whenever we ana-
lyze the provision of public goods, especially those public goods that are complex
and require long-term implementation.
The tests of Hypothesis 3 have produced coherent findings between the articles.
The results show that the effect of democracy on different sustainable development
outcomes related to environmental sustainability does seem to be contingent on
the quality of government. The patterns of the relationship, however, differ be-
tween the different outcomes. The results in Article 1, The Limits of Democracy
in Tackling Climate Change, indicate that the effect of democracy on CO2 emis-
sion levels depends on the level of corruption: more democratic countries tend to
emit less only when corruption is low. Similarly, the results show that lower lev-
els of corruption in democratic and semi-democratic regimes are associated with
lower carbon dioxide emissions per capita. For example, being democratic and
relatively uncorrupt Austria is more beneficial for reducing air emissions than be-
ing democratic and corrupt Slovakia. When corruption control is low, however,
the democracy level does not seem to make a difference for the level of emissions.
In practice, it means that it makes no difference to the level of carbon dioxide
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emissions if a country is a democratic and corrupt Jamaica or an authoritarian
and corrupt Azerbaijan.
The results in article 2, Do Political Institutions Moderate GDP-CO2 relation-
ship?, further specify that the interaction between democracy and corruption,
coupled also with civil society activities, moderates the relationship between eco-
nomic development and carbon dioxide emissions. The findings indicate that a
combination of strong democratic institutions, low corruption and an active civil
society is beneficial for reducing emissions of carbon dioxide if GDP per capita is
high. Countries that have this combination of political institutions have managed
to decouple economic growth from CO2 emissions.
The results in article 3, “Gimme Shelter”: the Role of Democracy and Institu-
tional Quality in Disaster Preparedness, support theoretical expectations that the
effect of democracy on natural disaster outcomes depends on countries’ quality of
government. Higher quality of government is associated with substantively lower
number of people affected by natural disasters only in countries that have also
reached a high level of democracy. For example, people suffer less in democra-
cies with high quality of government such as Sweden, Iceland, or the Netherlands
than in democratic Slovenia, where quality of government is lower. Among non-
democracies, quality of government does not seem to help disaster preparedness.
The positive effect of democracy on disaster outcomes was similarly shown to be
dependent on a country’s quality of government. More democracy seems to favor
disaster preparedness only when quality of government is relatively high, or, as
our models indicate, has reached a level on a par with that of Italy. Strikingly,
among countries where quality of government is low, i.e. lower than the level
of the Philippines, more democratic countries seem to suffer more from natural
disasters than do less democratic states. Our findings imply that only countries
that experience both high quality of government and the benefits of democracy
have a significantly fewer number of people affected by natural disasters than the
rest. Neither democracy nor high quality of government, taken separately, seems
to be a sufficient condition for disaster preparedness among political sources of
vulnerability. More democracy can even be more detrimental than less democracy
in contexts with pervasive corruption, incompetent and inefficient public adminis-
tration, and the lack of rule of law.
The results in article 4, In Light of Democracy and Dorruption: Institutional
Determinants of Electricity Provision, provide a contribution to the current debate
on the institutional determinants of electricity provision and complement the work
by Min (2015). The findings show that the effect of democratic experience on
electrification is conditional on the level of corruption in the public administration.
Democratic history is associated with a lower share of population living in unlit
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areas only if a country has been able to reduce corruption to at least a level on a
par with that of Moldova. In the context of widespread corruption, long experience
with democracy seem to have no effect on electricity provision to the population.
However, once a certain level of corruption control is in place, democracy does
have the expected desirable effect.
The results in article 5, Fresh Pipes with Dirty Water: How Quality of Gov-
ernment Shapes the Provision of Public Goods in Democracies, similarly indicate
that more democracy benefits water quality only when quality of government is
relatively high, or, according to our results, has reached a level on a par with that
of Greece. For example, this implies that water quality in more democratic and
relatively uncorrupt Belgium is better than in relatively uncorrupt Cyprus, which
has lower scores on the democracy indicators. When quality of government is low,
or lower than the level of Romania, more democracy is associated with higher
water pollution. For example, corrupt and more democratic Ukraine is expected
to have lower water quality than corrupt and authoritarian Azerbaijan, according
to our data and specifications.
The findings uniformly show that more democracy is only beneficial for sustain-
able development outcomes when quality of government is high, be it for a less
complex task for decision-makers such as the provision of energy, more complex
projects such as the protection of populations from natural disasters or highly
complex undertakings, such as reduction of organic water pollutants or CO2 emis-
sions. The quality of government threshold at which point democracy becomes
beneficial varies between the outcomes. For democracy to favor reduction of CO2
emissions, it requires corruption levels not higher than the score of 6 on a 0 to
10 scale, where 10 is least corrupt (due to inverse reading of the indicator). The
score of 6 approximately corresponds to corruption levels in Turkey. To benefit
disaster preparation, democracy seems to require a slightly higher quality of gov-
ernment, at approximately the level of 7 on a 0 to 10 scale, where 10 denotes
high QoG. The score of 7 approximately reflects the level of corruption in Italy.
Democracy’s positive association with organic water pollution reductions does not
come out significant until a country has reached a level of 7.5 on a 0-10 quality
of government scale, which is approximately the level of QoG in Spain. With re-
gards to electrification, the necessary level of corruption in public administration
for democracy to exert a positive effect is much lower, namely, 7 on a 0-10 scale,
where 10 is most corrupt. The indicator of democracy, however, here captures the
experience of democracy rather than current level of democratic development and
the lower moderating threshold of corruption can be due to the fact that higher
experience with democracy can partially account for lower levels of corruption in
our cross-country sample.
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Higher quality of government similarly has positive effects only in cases of demo-
cratic regimes. However, the findings vary between sustainable development goals.
With regards to CO2 emission reductions, QoG seems to already exert a positive
effect in semi-democracies that have reached a score of 5 on a 0-10 democracy
scale. The score of 5 is approximately the level of democracy in Ukraine. With
regards to reducing number of disaster victims, QoG seem to help only after a
democracy has reached as high a score as 8, which is the level of democracy in
Brazil. At the same time, democratic regimes with relatively high and low QoG
were not shown to perform significantly differently in the levels of organic water
pollution after democracy has reached the score of 4. Surprisingly, higher quality
of government seem to correlate with higher number of disaster victims and higher
levels of water pollution in autocracies. In the first case, the result can imply that
higher QoG simply does not help to protect populations from natural disasters if a
country is authoritarian. The reasons for why this is the case can be investigated
in future qualitative research. In the second case, it is likely that autocracies with
higher QoG focus on securing economic growth, while economic growth is often
associated with higher pollution.
Higher democracy also correlates with higher water pollution and a higher num-
ber of people affected by disasters in cases where the quality of government is low.
This implies that more democracy can actually be harmful for these environmental
sustainability outcomes unless a country has reached a certain level of QoG. In-
depth investigation of a typical case that scores high on democracy and low on qual-
ity of government in article 5 has revealed why this can be the case. Democracies
with weak quality of government seem to be dominated by business interests that
turn the attention of politicians away from sustainable development goals; they
lack the system of checks and balances that could otherwise constrain democratic
leaders from pursuing their own self-interests; they tend to have poor-functioning,
politicized public administration, incapable of developing action plans and imple-
menting policies. This seem to be the case even with experts taking high positions
in the public administration, because they end up stumbling across incoherent pol-
icy goals between agencies and constraints from politicians who are in their turn
guided by business interests. In sum, democracies with low QoG seem to develop
short time horizons incompatible with long-term policy goals such as sustainable
development, and these dysfunctional institutions, which tend to stimulate rulers’
self-interests, make democracies perform worse than authoritarian regimes.
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With climate change rapidly gathering pace, change in biodiversity changing the
integrity of the biosphere and ocean acidification destroying the marine ecosystems,
current environmental problems are both severe and urgent. While awareness
about environmental problems varies across the globe, there is at least a global
agreement that humanity needs to act. The question is: How? The nature of
ecological problems makes them invisible to decision-makers and creates diluted
sources of responsibility, which makes voluntary collective action for protecting
the environment unlikely. At the same time, environmental protection creates
externalities, which makes private markets unlikely to engage in environmental
protection if left to their own devices. Environmental protection and achieving
environmental sustainability thus requires universal public goods provision, as well
as regulations and “legitimate coercion”, which can only be secured by countries’
governments.
This dissertation began by comparing different countries in their environmental
performance: Netherlands and Bangladesh in their response to natural disasters,
Romania and Moldova in their water quality, and Japan and China in the air
quality in their main cities. The main argument of this dissertation is that in
order to understand the differences in countries’ performance, we need to turn to
characteristics that make states likely to commit to and reach environmental sus-
tainability. Taking as a point of departure theories about states’ political systems,
this dissertation’s focus has been on the connection between the institutions that
guide the functioning of the input-side of political systems, which shapes prefer-
ence aggregation in policy-making, and institutions that guide the functioning of
the output-side of political systems, which shapes policy implementation. The in-
teraction of institutions that shape the functioning of the input- and output-sides
of the political system, this dissertation argues, to a large part determines how
and whether states commit to and implement public policy programs, including
environmental programs.
The aim of this dissertation has been to revisit existing theories positing that
democratic governments carry the characteristics necessary to address environ-
mental problems and reach environmental sustainability goals. I argue that in
order to understand the political determinants of environmental performance the
focus on democracy is insufficient and has to be accompanied by equal attention to
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the quality of government, which, broadly, encompasses the absence of corruption,
high rule of law and high bureaucratic capacity. Democratic institutions primarily
account for the functioning of the input-side of political systems. They determine
the rules for representation and peoples’ access to political power and therefore
influence decision-making based on the aggregation of preferences for sustainable
development. They also influence the size of population entitled to receive such
public goods that are related to environmental sustainability. At the same time,
quality of government shapes government capacity to implement sustainable de-
velopment policies. It defines how the decisions to distribute public goods are
implemented and whether they are implemented at all. The interaction between
the two sets of political institutions, I argue, overall shapes a country’s ability to
address complex problems, such as the challenge of sustainable development.
The articles in the dissertation compare how countries around the globe perform
in addressing the sustainable development goals related to environmental sustain-
ability set by the United Nations (United Nations 2015). More specifically, the five
articles examine how democratic institutions interact with quality of government in
delivering the different public goods related to environmental sustainability. The
results support theoretical expectations that the effect of democracy on sustain-
able development outcomes is conditional on countries’ ability to implement tasks
and deliver public services. The results consistently show that more democracy is
only beneficial for sustainable development outcomes when quality of government
is high. This is true both for highly complex tasks, such as reduction of organic
water waste or climate change mitigation and reduction of CO2 emissions, and
for less complex projects such as the provision of energy or climate change adap-
tation and preparation for future disasters. Coupled with an active civil society,
democracy and high quality of government seem to also moderate the relationship
between economic development and CO2 emissions. This implies that democratic
and largely uncorrupt countries with an active civil society have managed to de-
couple economic growth from the emission of carbon dioxide. For the delivery
of public goods related to environmental sustainability, such as preparedness for
natural disasters and high water quality, more democracy even seems to be detri-
mental if quality of government is low. As results from the case study show, in
the absence of constraints, political leaders in democracies with poor-functioning
institutions tend to focus on satisfying their own short-term interests rather than
serving the interests of the public and, as a result, such democracies fail to deliver
desirable outcomes to the people.
The state of the environment can depend on a multitude of factors, includ-
ing economy, geography and demographics. The results of the studies included
in this dissertation illustrate that even when accounting for other relevant expla-
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nations of environmental conditions we experience today, politics still makes a
difference. Democratic institutions do seem to contribute to higher environmental
performance, however only on the condition of high quality of government. The-
ories suggest that democracies perform better because of the greater likelihood
that environmental issues will appear on political agendas in democracies than in
other regime types. The results of the studies included in this dissertation make
an important specification: democracies can only perform better if their quality of
government is high enough to secure the implementation of such long-term policies
as environmental protection.
These results, however, do not imply that countries with other forms of gov-
ernment cannot ensure environmental sustainability. We evidence more and more
individual examples of successful environmental reforms in authoritarian regimes:
Singapore is one of the busiest and most densely populated, but at the same time,
cleanest cities on the planet. China is continuously making reforms to implement
environmental programs. The analysis in this dissertation does not neglect such
cases. What the results instead show is that the actions of authoritarian regimes
towards environmental protection have not yet been as systematic as actions of
democratic states to reflect in the statistical results. The advantage of statisti-
cal analysis is that it helps us zoom out from isolated cases and success stories
to see whether certain characteristics of political systems can make a difference
globally. Given the state of the world as it is known now, it seems as if in general
only democracies with high government quality have managed to achieve higher
environmental performance than others and a combination of strong democratic
institutions and high quality of government do seem to make a significant difference
compared to alternative characteristics of political systems.
The contribution of this dissertation is two-fold. First, the dissertation con-
tributes to the environmental politics literature by investigating the “black box”
of the state examining the political institutions necessary for committing to and
reaching environmental sustainability goals. Second, the dissertation contributes
to the political science literature on the institutional determinants of public goods
provision by emphasizing the necessity of considering the combination of institu-
tions within the political system in the production of public goods and by extending
the previous findings to a new, environmental domain.
The results have clear policy implications. To solve environmental problems
today, a focus on solely amending the behavior of individuals in collective action
problems or countries’ behavior in global environmental regimes is insufficient.
We need to understand state institutions and the interaction between them when
designing environmental reforms as they shape the incentive structures of peo-
ple’s choices domestically and countries’ choices in the international arena. In
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particular, when committing to environmental reforms, decision-makers and pol-
icy advisers should pay particular attention to the quality of government and the
level of democratic development of the countries in which the reform will take
place. Simply adopting environmental policies and extending funding is not suf-
ficient. Building the capacity of environmental agencies, strengthening environ-
mental courts and reducing corruption in the environmental inspectorate should
be necessary elements in any environmental reform.
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide detailed recommendations
on how to improve the quality of government for better environmental perfor-
mance. We can infer from the existing literature that policy-makers should first
and foremost target the incentives of the involved stakeholders, within and outside
the government apparatus. For example, this can imply stimulating the incentives
of bureaucrats to commit to long-term implementation by employing experts in
the environmental agencies rather than political cronies, thereby securing their
careers and salaries. It can also imply stimulating the long time horizons of po-
litical leaders by supporting the development of programmatic parties that have
environmental agendas secured in their programs, or by strengthening the political
opposition/independent judiciary to promote checks and balances. Any environ-
mental reform should also place an emphasis on including experts who are aware
of the breadth and complexity of environmental problems in decision-making pro-
cedures. The qualitative findings of this dissertation, however, emphasize, that
including experts is not enough in the context of weak systems of checks and bal-
ances and the presence of corruption. Even the most knowledgeable public officials
and advisers can face obstacles to their service if there is a powerful, unconstrained
influence of interests that go against the needs of the environment over the politi-
cal decision-making and politicians, in turn, can interfere in the functioning of the
public administration. As elements of governmental quality are tightly intercon-
nected in delivering the success of environmental sustainability projects, reforms
should concern all relevant elements of governmental quality simultaneously.
The results of this dissertation also suggest that putting high hopes on the
equally successful enviromental performance of all democratic governments is quite
preliminary. While many Western democracies have shown examples of high envi-
ronmental performance, the democratic regimes of Latin America and the democ-
racies developed after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, lag behind. With the
third wave of democratization giving hope for a “better” world, this dissertation
reminds that weak quality of government limits democratic institutions. The arti-
cles in the dissertation provide empirical evidence that democracy is, at most, not
sufficient for solving the complex problems, such as those related to environmen-
tal sustainability, that societies have to face today. This dissertation emphasizes
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that this is because environmental issues are a particular challenge for democratic
regimes. As decision-making in democracies relies on constant feedback between
citizens’ demands and governments’ commitments and actions, democratic insti-
tutions are particularly suited to the provision of public goods and services that
are quickly deliverable, have clear responsibility channels tied to countries’ gov-
ernments, and visible to an electorate, who can judge the performance of their
governments. Quality of government, no doubt, benefits the provision of such
goods and services. Yet, it is not a necessary condition for their delivery. Demo-
cratic governments, in some instances, can deliver some such goods and services
without a particularly high governmental quality. However, slow-moving, invisible,
highly complex environmental problems with uncertain tipping points require more
than democratic institutions. They also require a set of political institutions that
can guarantee their viability on the political agenda and secure implementation
against the incentives for short-sighted behavior. This dissertation emphasizes
that quality of government is a large and necessary part of this set of political
institutions.
6.1 Avenues for future research
Future research can focus on conducting more qualitative enquiries into the mech-
anisms of the interaction patterns revealed in the different studies to provide policy
recommendations as to which political drivers of poor environmental performance
to target. For example, future studies can compare the performance of democratic
regimes, with both high and low quality of government, against the performance of
authoritarian regimes with high quality of government to conclude whether democ-
racy is a necessary condition for high environmental performance at all. Due to the
small number of authoritarian regimes with high governmental quality in the world
today, it is currently impossible to conclude whether such regimes outperform the
world’s democracies on average, using statistical analysis. However, exploring the
drivers of the successful environmental performance of authoritarian regimes and
comparing these qualitatively to the drivers of success and failure in democracies
can provide important insights into the sufficient conditions for successful environ-
mental reforms.
The advantage of looking at the connection between underlying institutional
conditions and the state of the environment is that such analysis allows investiga-
tion into how the broad features of political systems play out for environmental
outcomes. A natural step forward can be to investigate the role of more narrow
institutional conditions on environmental policy commitments and the effect of
different decision-making procedures: whether democracy is presidential or par-
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liamentary, the role of decentralization, the number of veto players, and party
composition in parliament. Further research can also model the mediating effect
of environmental policies and public opinion on the effect of democracy on en-
vironmental sustainability outcomes, as well as investigate the effect of different
types of policies and policy instruments on environmental outcomes. Such detailed
investigation can provide the opportunity to look for more precise mechanisms of
democracy’s effect on the environment and suggest a more narrow set of conditions
favorable to stronger environmental performance.
The results of this dissertation show that quality of government matters for
the performance of democracies. Therefore, politicians have reasons to intervene
in the organization of bureaucratic agencies or transform institutions shaping the
working of the executive branch (Dahlström and Holmgren 2017; Holmgren 2018).
This implies that quality of government can be considered a mediator or a mech-
anism through which democratic rulers can achieve official goals (e.g., Montinola
and Jackman 2002; Shefter 1994). There is a vast literature, however, arguing that
quality of government or state capacity precedes the establishment of democratic
institutions, which implies that it is democracy that should be treated as a me-
diator in the suggested models (e.g., D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017; Fortin 2012;
Linz and Stepan 1996; Møller and Skaaning 2011). Without giving preference to
either of the sequencing theories, in this dissertation I do not explore the medi-
ating effects of either of the factors, instead treating them as interdependent and
modelling interaction effects. Future studies can investigate possible mediation.
A broader puzzle that I stumbled across while writing this dissertation is what
constitutes long time horizons of both authoritarian and democratic regimes. Long
time horizons are not necessarily attributes of country leaders but rather a result
of institutional configurations favorable to the adoption of policies aimed at long-
term implementation. Future research can investigate which institutional config-
urations, both in autocracies and democracies, make governments more likely to
credibly commit to policies that only bring results after a long time lag, such as
environmental protection. While political stability has been found to matter for
time horizons in authoritarian regimes (Wright 2008), we know very little about
the prerequisites of long time horizons in democracies.
Environmental sustainability is a multidimensional issue and this dissertation
only taps into a few of its components. As ecological systems are complex and
each of the environmental sustainability goals is unique, plausibly requiring dis-
tinct combinations of governing approaches, we cannot safely assume that the
results of the studies included in this dissertation are generalizable to other en-
vironmental sustainability goals. Future studies can test the hypothesis positing
the interaction between democracy and quality of government on other aspects
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of environmental sustainability, such as preserving biodiversity, the health of ma-
rine ecosystems, sustainable production and consumption, and the provision of
clean energy. Such analysis can verify if the results of the studies included in
this dissertation can be generalizable to other environmental sustainability goals,
i.e. whether the combination of democratic institutions and quality of govern-
ment is indeed suited to reaching all sustainable development outcomes related to
environmental sustainability.
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Appendix
Division of countries according to democracy and quality of government
dimensions in 2010
Quality of Government
(ICRG)
Above mean (>5.5) Below mean (<5.5)
Democracy
(Electoral
Democracy
Index,
V-Dem)
Above
mean
(>5.5)
Finland France Lithuania Colombia
Iceland Chile Argentina Panama
Denmark Portugal Turkey Brazil
Austria Spain Mongolia Suriname
Netherlands South Korea Trinidadand Tobago Moldova
Sweden Taiwan Indonesia Bulgaria
New Zealand Slovenia Philippines Bolivia
Norway Czech Republic Peru Albania
Canada Croatia Mexico El Salvador
Australia Poland Uruguay Burkina Faso
Germany Hungary Lebanon Guatemala
Belgium India Ghana Senegal
Switzerland Slovakia Costa Rica Dominican Republic
Ireland Greece Serbia Sierra Leone
United Kingdom Namibia South Africa Liberia
Japan Estonia Jamaica Mali
Cyprus Latvia Ecuador Paraguay
United States Italy Guyana
Israel Botswana Romania
Below
mean
(<5.5)
Singapore Ukraine Gabon Azerbaijan
Malaysia Zambia DR Congo Somalia
Kuwait Pakistan Algeria Cuba
Morocco Bangladesh Cameroon Iran
Jordan Guinea-Bissau Uganda Vietnam
Tunisia Tanzania Gambia Syria
Oman Cote d’Ivoire Armenia Myanmar
Qatar Nicaragua Guinea China
Saudi Arabia Iraq Russia North Korea
Venezuela Angola Libya
Sri Lanka Yemen
Mozambique Congo
Honduras Niger
Kenya Zimbabwe
Togo Kazakhstan
Papua
New Guinea Sudan
Nigeria Ethiopia
Malawi Belarus
Haiti Madagascar
Thailand Egypt
Note: The table was produced using Quality of Government dataset, version jan17 (Teorell et al. 2017)
and Varieties of Democracy dataset version 7.1 (Coppedge et al. 2017)
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